The IIP reached out to its members of the advisory board and other friends of the IIP and asked them to write a short assessment about what the coming year would bring. The authors come from various countries and backgrounds in the world. This outlook, not surprisingly, focuses on the most pressing issues: Great Power conflict, US, China, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, the Middle East, nuclear weapons, cyber-security; Covid does not play the most prominent role in the predictions. The suggestions and recommendations are creative, original and express different views. Some contributions focus on a single issue, while others cover several topics. Therefore, we do not to structure them according to themes and publish them in alphabetic order.
My predictions for Russia-West relations in 2022 are mostly gloomy but not over-dramatic. On Russia’s ultimatum concerning NATO, diplomacy and belligerent rhetoric will go hand by hand. An eventual mutually acceptable formula would require alteration of positions of principle by one side or by both– which is impossible for the West and highly improbable for Russia. Russia’s pressure on Ukraine and the counter-actions of the West will continue and might become more assertive. However, both sides will try to avoid crossing the line which might open the way for uncontrolled escalation. As in any conflict of this type, two most dangerous factors are activities of domestic “hawks” and the cumulative logic of growing military confrontation. Containing these factors will be the challenge for the year 2022. But in a parallel way, there seem to be relatively good chances for cooperative interaction in some spheres on the basis of common interest – from fighting cyber criminality to even renewed (even if selective) arms control efforts.
Vladimir Baranovsky
Russian Academy of Sciences / Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations
“Prediction is difficult- particularly when it involves the future.”
Mark Twain’s famous bon mot reminds us that political developments are highly contingent and that rather different futures are possible, yet not equally likely. Concerning one of the fields that currently interests me – (humanitarian) military interventions – it seems rather likely that with the failure in Afghanistan and the dire situation in Mali, the era of large-scale, multi-dimensional and transformative interventions is coming to an end. Less likely are the consequences of the realization that these interventions do not achieve their aims. If civil wars, state failure and systematic atrocities by abhorrent authoritarian regimes that effect the regional stability and the stability of Western states in various ways cannot be cured by a combination of military stabilization and political intervention aimed at changing the root causes of conflict, what then? Are alternative intervention strategies in store? Or will Western states try to draw up the bridges and isolate themselves from chaos in neighbouring regions?
Regarding the second field that interests me – European security – predictions have a far lower level of certainty. An escalation of the current conflict over the security status of Ukraine – not the most likely scenario but definitely conceivable at the time of writing – would change the European security landscape completely. Even if both sides manage to avoid the outbreak of hostilities, I expect that a continuation of the high level of tensions is more likely than a settlement of Russian-Western conflicts. The outcome of the Presidential elections in France and the midterm elections in the US will also affect the future of European integration and European security. I expect that over the course of this year, the adaptation of the Western security architecture to the shifting global balance of power will continue at a snail’s pace.
Matthias Dembinski
Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
In spite of the efforts at resolving some of the past year’s major global challenges, namely the pandemic of Covid-19 variants and conflict spillovers across many regions, many problems still need to be addressed. The following are some key issues to watch in 2022:
I. Continued Effeccts of Covid-19 Pandemic:
The strains on food supplies due to the pandemic and climate change, interruptions in supply chains and inflation remain some of the perplexing issues globally. Moreover, the Coronavirus outbreak over the past two years not only has had far-reaching consequences on world economy, but it has also affected certain foreign policies, e.g. the US attempt to contain China.
II. Strategic Challenges for US and Europe:
The current political dynamism between the United States and Russia, focusing on the developments in Ukraine and the need to design a new architecture for European security, does not reflect the prospect of an immediate exit from the current stalemate. In the meantime, the change of government in Germany and the forthcoming French presidential election can impact Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Europe currently faces strategic challenges in three geopolitical areas this year: first and foremost, there is the issue of Russia's ambitions in Eastern Europe, including Russia’s support for minorities in Eastern European countries and its backing of right-wing groups in Europe. Being in the neighborhood of the Middle East, Europe is also exposed to the spillover effects of regional security concerns, especially the migration crisis.
In addition, Europe needs to cooperate with the US policy of containing China, particularly with regard to the Indo-Pacific region. This is mainly because the security divergence between the United States and Europe is projected to intensify in 2022. While the US is trying to accelerate the containment of China in the Indo-Pacific, Europe’s priority is maintaining a security and economic order and preventing the escalation of conflicts in the Middle East.
III. Middle East Flashpoints and Potentials for Cooperation:
Due to the continuing rivalry between the US and China, it can be expected that regional convergence trends in the East Asia will be further strengthened. Furthermore, although the Indo-Pacific region has become the intersection of multiple powers' interests, the Middle East will probably still be exploited as a means to counterbalance the Western pressures on Russia and China, particularly in the security and economic spheres.
In the Persian Gulf, the initial obsession with the Abraham accords is fading away, specifically due to the uncertainties regarding Saudi enthusiasm and intentions on joining the accords. On the other hand, as the Vienna talks over the JCPOA proceed, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is reaching out for dialogue with Tehran.
The Vienna talks on Iran’s nuclear program will indeed play a vital role on any future prospects of a regional stabilization. Some progress on the original JCPOA or an interim deal appear to be close, since the breakdown of the talks would have dire consequences and ominous outcomes for all parties, perhaps with the exception of one or two regional players.
These developments and prospects indicate the necessity of forming regional coalitions that would involve interests and threats common among internal and external state actors, such as countering terrorism, drug trafficking and refugee crisis, esp. after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, as well as combating climate change and finding solutions for sustainable development. Assisting Iran in the field of renewable energies and establishing a joint energy consortium with the participation of Iran and Saudi Arabia can be a step in this direction.
Eurica
Iranian Institute for European and American Studies (Iran)
The focus of the year 2022, at least for the first half of the year, will still be on combatting the Covid-19 pandemic and its socio-economic consequences for economies and health systems as well as for people all over the world. However, one of the major issues also discussed in 2021 is the evident climate crisis, which somehow has lost public attention due to the ongoing challenges in relation with the pandemic. Whereas, especially in the German speaking countries of the European Union, mistrust towards science and scientists could be observed in relation to the discussion about anti-Covid measures or compulsory vaccines, the general situation, security-wise, did also deteriorate in the year 2021. With the build-up of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border and the consequent fear of Ukraine of an additional violent escalation, the recent events in Kazakhstan, the dangerous political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Ethiopia and a general perception of a renewed Cold War between the US and China, the world does not seem to have become more secure. Since the climate crisis is the one issue, which concerns every country in the world, it bares some potential of cooperation. Acknowledging that global goals only can be reached if every side also want them to be met, it is essential to understand that every individual person, every state, and every company will need to dispense of several conveniences in order to mitigate the consequences of the ongoing climate crisis. If this conviction prevails, there is hope for dialogue also on other relevant issues.
Stephanie Fenkart
Director of the International Institute for Peace
President Biden’s opinion polls are not favourable. The Republicans and the hawks in his own Democratic Party are requesting an offensive foreign policy. To gain the support of conservative votes at the elections to the Congress in November 2022, Joseph Biden will take a tough route in international affairs. China should not be allowed to catch up with the US, neither economically nor militarily. To prevent this, global alliances will be established. They will be underpinned with idealist legitimacy, like democracy. His idea of an “Alliances of Democracies” against autocracies is a case in point. He will not hesitate to ally with authoritarian states, if it serves the geopolitical interests of the US, however. NATO and Ukraine will be armed to be prepared for an assumed Russian attack. President Biden will not get new treaties through the Congress. He will rather impose sanctions. He will try to come to the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA) against strong domestic resistance. He knows that the failure to do so, might lead to war in the Middle East, in which he does not want to become entangled.
This offensive strategy did not help President Jimmy Carter. After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 1979, he suspended the détente policy, and began a massive arms build-up. In his Doctrine he threatened with intervention if a foreign power intervenes in the Middle East. Against the Soviet Union and China, he started a human rights campaign. He tried (without success) to liberate the hostages in Iran with a military action. In spite of this hardline foreign policy, Jimmy Carter lost the elections against Ronald Reagan in 1980. A very aggressive foreign policy followed. This analogy might tell us what the world can expect for 2022 and the following years.
Heinz Gärtner
Professor at the University of Vienna / Chair of the IIP Advisory Board
Iran. The JCPOA is unlikely to be revived. Nor a new and longer lasting agreement would be reached. However , there will be a temporary agreement that will provide Iran with some sanctions relief and thus a degree of economic respite.The agreement at best would last until the end of the Biden Presidency. Domestically, power will increasingly be concentrated at the hands of the IRGC and the intelligence agencies, although the outward aspects of a representative government , such as regular elections will remain intact. Iran's political dynamics will also increasingly be influenced by the succession issue to Ayatollah Khamenei , who will turn 83 in April 2022.
In external relations, Iran's relations with Iraq and Syria will become more complicated, and Tehran most probably would lose much of its influence in Iraq and Syria, especially as the latter gradually becomes reintegrated into the Arab World. Meanwhile, any major breakthrough in Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia is unlikely to take place. Talks will continue and there might be minor progress on minor issues. But, real reconciliation is unlikely.
If sanctions relief are real and Iran can again trade internationally and access its financial resources, the chances of a revival of Tehran's economic relations with, at least, some European countries would improve. The same would be true in case of Iran's trade with neighboring states and other Asian states, notably India.
Turkey. It is very likely that Turkish politics will enter a period of instability and return to the conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. President Erdogan is clearly weakening both physically and politically, and there is no single political party or a coalition of parties that could replace him. Erdogan's departure from the Turkish political scene could have significant implications for the entire Middle East, depending which direction Turkish politics take.
Iraq and Syria. The biggest unknown regarding Iraq is the role that Muqta Sadr might play, and especially , whether he would be able to impose his vision of Iraq;'s future on other political groups. If Sadr succeeds , Iraq's relations with Iran are likely to suffer, whereas ties with Arab states most likely will improve. But if Sadr fails, then Iraqi politics could become even more unstable and volatile than before. The situation in Syria most likely will remain as is. Full reintegration in the Arab world is unlikely. But Syria's isolation is set to be eased.
Shireen Hunter
Georgetown University
The quest for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East will continue to be in the spotlight, but the expectations that advances will be observed in 2022 are low. First, the NPT Review Conference that addresses this issue as a central theme of its agenda, was postponed again amid the COVID surge. It is uncertain that the conference will be held this year. Second, the negotiations around a new nuclear deal between Iran and China, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, and the EU, that are taking place in Vienna, will occupy the center stage due to its implication for Middle East regional security. Third, The Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction that was held in 2019 and 2021 and scheduled to convene again in 2022, will hardly move things forward. Discussions on procedure have overweighted real achievements, like the drafting of a would-be treaty or the inclusion of Israel in the negotiations. In sum, in 2022 the vision of the Middle East free of nuclear weapons will continue as relevant as ever since it was put forward first in 1974. However, its actual realization will have to wait for the time being.
Exequiel Lacovsky
Research Associate, Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine/NATO will either escalate further or all parties will center their negotiations around some form of neutrality for Ukraine. If it will be called “neutrality” or just de-facto become a no-mans land is unclear. There is a strong tendency from both sides to avoid the actual word “neutrality.” The NATO alliance is highly dismissive of the concept, Ukraine’s internal politics seems not to favor the approach, and Russia has not been mentioning a neutralization of Ukraine as a possible policy in its December 17 proposals to the US and NATO. However, it seems to be clear that the only policy that could satisfy the basic needs of all parties would be a neutrality in conjunction with the realization of the Minsk agreements.
Secondly, Some other former communist states will likely continue their march toward official neutrality. Most importantly Mongolia, Serbia, and of course Turkmenistan. Also for Afghanistan it’s possible that we will see the beginning of a neutralist policy of the Taliban in their foreign relations. I am also expecting South East Asian countries to keep stressing neutrality or non-aligned policies and Sri Lanka, too.
Lottaz Pascal
Waseda Institute for Advanced Study
In the fields of security policy, international law and geopolitics, the big players' lab of checks-and-balances in a world of growing strategic autonomy remains critical. Eastern Ukraine, Taiwan or Afghanistan clearly show how delusive global consensus for peace has become. The role of polarising figures, such as the French presidency under immediate electoral pressure, may have an escalating effect in multilateral arenas. But even if this should not disrupt sustained efforts to fight climate change and promote well-being for all in the short run, it has ever more the potential to further undermine eroded willingness to follow the longer way of dialogue instead of favouring decisions in isolation. Nuclear and energy security will be a case in point.
Ursula Wether Pietsch
Lecturer University of Graz and University of German Armed Forces Munich
The year 2022 looks set to become a critical juncture for European security in general and the situation in Eastern Europe in particular. In other words, what happens in 2022 will predetermine the nature and direction of developments in years to come. The post Cold War rather benign international environment in the region is long over and this year will likely make it clear even to the most incorrigible optimists.
There are two core developments to watch, both of which will have strong strategic implications. Firstly, the Russian ultimatum on security guarantees will lead to expanding security talks between Moscow and NATO capitals. Yet, as of early January 2022, the basis for a compromise is barely sufficient to produce lasting and mutually satisfactory agreements. Hence, the likelihood of a major crisis in European security is extremely high. Were such a crisis to occur, it would have direct and highly dangerous ramifications for Eastern Europe, no matter what form and shape a potential crisis takes. Secondly, Eastern Europe is experiencing a major structural disruption, which remains largely unnoticed behind current headlines. As a result of multiple ongoing domestic and international tensions, established logistical, trade and energy infrastructure, as well as communication channels are being broken, which results inevitably in the ruining of the region's fabric and cooperative atmosphere. My Minsk Dialogue colleagues have dubbed this process "the Balkanisation of Eastern Europe" (https://minskdialogue.by/en/research/analitycs-notes/security-in-eastern-europe-in-2021-balkanization-of-the-region). If history of any lesson, such a process is unfortunately likely to lead to calamity.
Yauheni Preiherman
Director of the Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations
2022 is likely to continue to surprise us, for the better (political economy) or for the worse (security). On the economic front, the continued push by the EU to invest in the green transition and the digital transformation while addressing inequalities offers great hope for Europe and the planet. We can expect that a progressive alliance in the EU will be reinforced by a renewal of the Franco-German couple (with the re-election of French President Emanuel Macron), further invigorated by Draghi continuing as Italian Prime Minister. But the rumblings in the security arena, whether sabre rattling on the Ukraine or Taiwan, remain worrisome. And here, the EU is largely incapable of doing much to solve the problems.
Vivien A. Schmidt
Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, Boston University
“A few sentences about my predictions of the most important developments in my field”
China will continue its pivot towards Eurasia, where it will remain united with Russia. In turn, the US will strengthen its pressing simultaneously on Russia and China. It will refuse Russian proposal to stop NATO’s expansion towards post-soviet territory (Ukraine, Belarus, South Caucasus and Central Asia). The NATO member Turkey will continue competition with Moscow for Ukraine and South Caucasus, it will continue its march towards Central Asia for implementing the US’s New Silk Road project, which aims to oust Russia and China from South Caucasus and Central Asia. Nagorno Karabakh problem will remain one of the main security issues of the Eurasian continent. It is true, that Europe is interested on energy resources of Baku, but as a center of democracy it must respect the right of self-determination of Armenians of Karabakh. Opening transportation infrastructure, borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between Armenia and Turkey will bring peace to the region, but it can be done by mediation and support of Russia, EU and the US.
International community will testimony divided world with 2 main poles-Western pole (the US and allies) and Eastern pole (Sino-Russian tandem and partners). After the “Summit of Democracies” now we have also “ideological” struggle between the so called “democracies” and “authoritative” regimes, which is typical to “Cold War”. In the 21st century Western and Eastern poles will continue their struggle for the markets of technologies and vaccinas. 2022 will stand another challenging year for humanity for this reason International Institute for Peace and likeminded organizations needs to unite efforts and work hard for maintaining peace and security.
Mher Sahakyan
Director of China-Eurasia Council for Political and Strategic Research, Armenia / Lecturer Russian-Armenian University
Cybersecurity
Threat actors will become more sophisticated as ransomware attacks will continue to be a challenge for global economic stability. The health sector will continue to be targeted by criminal groups as they continue to be an easy target for data theft and ransomware. EU Joint Cyber Unit will start to functions, we will start to see affects on the fourth quarter of 2022. Influence operation by EU rivals will continue to try to destabilize our democracy values.
Geopolitics
US & West Europe - China fierce competition for technological and power dominance will dominate the geopolitical discourse. Russia will continue to challenge NATO and pause a threat to the eastern European front to add to the tension and the risk of escalation in Ukraine, with the deployment Russian troops at the border. Iran nuclear deal will unleash the Iranian quest for regional dominance while Iran will not neglect its military nuclear vision. Israel-Palestinian conflict is not likely to change its basic characteristics, while the PA continues to function as a failed entity. The Afghanistan humanitarian crisis will require some challenged decisions by the US and the EU as debate is to what degree of recognition and dialogue should be with the Taliban. Islamic terror will not disappear, and we will see more attempts by radicalized individuals (lone wolves) and less of organized terror groups. Climate change and climate-related disasters as a geopolitical risk of instability because of population movements due to water and food shortage.
Annita Larissa Sciacovelli
Prof aggr di diritto internazionale, Università degli studi di Bari "Aldo Moro"
2022 will see another stage in the fight between authoritarian and democratic nations, governments and movements, especially inside Europe. Recent elections have shown, that at least in basically democratic systems, populist and authoritarian leaders can be outvoted. But the biggest test will come in Hungary, Serbia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Worldwide, kleptocratic and narcotic regimes will continue to play a big role. Kryptocurrencies support their activities in the global shadow economy. These forces will also try to proceed with their influence inside Europe! Europe will unfortunately be characterized by continuing tensions concerning Ukraine and by a failure to agree on a long term security architecture where US and Russia would have a positive role to play. Neither the US nor Russia will contribute to a viable security architecture in Europe as a whole.
Concerning the European neighbourhood in the Middle East, Turkey will continue to arrange itself with its neighbors, maybe even with Armenia. But there will be nor progress concerning the Cyprus issue. Unfortunately Israel‘s new government does neither design nor implement a new policy, especially in relations to the Palestinians. In Lebanon there will be no breakthrough by domestic political forces towards fighting the failed state. Syria will be more and more a Narco-State. There are chances to renew the JCPOA with Iran and in this case the relations to Arab countries will improve. The United Emirates will play an increasing regional role!
Overall, Europe and it‘s neighbourhood will be affected by several conflicts and tensions. In spite of Commission President Van der Leyen‘s call for more geopolitics, the EU will be mostly concerned with „domestic“ issues, including its climate strategy and not being able to come forward with stronger and viable proposals about its geopolitical role! The biggest failure will be a lack of ideas for a comprehensive European security architecture!
Hannes Swoboda
President of the International Institute for Peace and former MEP
The ongoing worldwide drone attacks make us aware of the fact that unmanned weapon systems have become the means of the first choice in modern warfare and, at the same time, show the performance capabilities that such drones currently have. Current drone warfare is an evident phenomenon of modern wars. Therfore we will see in 2022 additional state and non state actors who will use drones in conflict zones. They are a cheap and efficient tool and, if used accordingly, can have a strategic impact. In addition they certainly enable terrorist organizations to strike from long distances.
Markus Reisner
Colonel at the Austrian Armed Forces
More than a year into the presidency of Joe Biden the marginalization of the Middle East for US foreign policy is continuing, giving room of maneuver as well urgency to regional actors to establish a regional balance of power of their own. In this framework negotiations among conflicting actors of the past years will intensify, though it is an open question if a new regional security architecture will evolve in the short-term. Probably not, but all sides will want to avoid open confrontations. Talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran; Turkey and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE; as well as the re-embracement of Qatar into the fold of the GCC will continue – probably without any significant event: it is their continuation that will be relevant.
The GCC seems to have lost the appetite to be involved in the proceedings of the Levant, be it Syria or Lebanon, so it could be said that after the relative break-away of the Maghreb from the wider Arab fold, the Levant is quietly shifting away, too. The big question for 2022 will be what that may mean for Israel and the Palestinians: will the Abraham Accords be expanded to include more states, if so, who those states may be. Yet, the implementation of the Abraham Accords is still pending, with very different results in the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan.
The negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and an eventual return to the JCPOA are slowly proceeding, with expectations – in recent days – running high, but it is as yet unknown what the exact details of the re-launched JCPOA would be. A limited agreement seems almost certain now to emerge in the next one-two months, yet the expansion of the themes to be included (Iran’s regional policies, the missile program) still seems to be of no-interest for the Iranian leadership.
Consequently, and taking into account that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been in office since 1989, Iranian regional and foreign policy will most probably also reflect a high grade of continuity. The focus will remain the maintenance and the survival of the velayat-e faqih, especially with the question of Ayatollah Khamenei’s legacy (he is 82) and the eventual succession.
2022 will also test Turkey’s recent assertivism in its foreign and security policy: tensions within NATO, tensions with Europeans over Libya, Syria, and the recent “openings” towards leading Arab states.
In short, while 2022 has the potential for surprise, it will probably be a year of continuity rather than drastic change.
Erzsébet N. Rózsa
Institute of World Economics
Russia-Ukraine conflict
With the likelihood of a military conflict escalation in Ukraine, the year 2022 risks to become an annus horribilis.
After unsuccessful attempts by diplomacy in January 2022 to solve the differences between Russia and US/NATO over NATO membership of Ukraine, Russia threatens to respond militarily against Ukraine. There are numerous scenarios of how such a threat could be played out, but key results could lead to a de-facto division of Ukraine, the militarization of the border areas (Belarus/NATO and Belarus/Ukraine) and a humanitarian tragedy. The West announced severe economic sanctions that could in time lead to negative economic consequences if not disruptions across all of Europe. It could also mean the return to a Cold War zero-sum scenario overshadowing pan-European and Euro-Atlantic space with new politico-military structures based on deterrence and escalation dominance.
Energy security and vulnerabilities in Europe to supply disruptions will be a dominant theme and on top of policy agendas in the OSCE area because:
(1) tensions and possible armed conflicts in Eastern Europe would disrupt the supply of natural gas from Russia to the West,
(2) an unorderly climate transition in many European countries with exits from nuclear power, commitments to reduce dependency from fossil fuels while unable to cover the gap with renewable energy.
OSCE
The OSCE with its Polish Chairmanship in 2022 may be caught up in a possible Russia-Ukrainian armed conflict and the possible escalation across Eastern Europe.
· In case of the use of force by Russia and/or Ukraine, the safe evacuation of the approx. 1000 OSCE monitors and staff in Eastern Ukraine would become a priority. The OSCE may assume again the role of a mediator and explore to what extent pre-existing arrangements (Minsk agreements, Trilateral Contact Group) would still be a viable basis of post-conflict negotiations and settlements.
· In a positive scenario where diplomacy would prevail, the OSCE could become the hub for new negotiations on arms control and risk reduction measures and support the Minsk implementation efforts.
The socio-political effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will still be prevalent in the OSCE area, with critical pressures on the health sectors especially in Central Asia, Southern Caucasus and Southeastern Europe.
A multitude of threats and risk will continue to affect the OSCE area, including cyber-attacks, nationalistic exclusionary polices, failing states and a traumatized Central Asia that after the shock in Kazakhstan in January 2022 will be hedging forcefully against “colour revolutions” and Islamic extremism. The proximity of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will require enhanced OSCE programmatic engagement with the Central Asian states in border security management, countering transnational organized crime and radicalization/Islamic extremism.
On a more positive note:
· A timid rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey last year could show first fruits in 2022, possibly with a return to the Zürich Protocols of 2009. A normalization between Turkey and Armenia would lead unequivocally to an improvement of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On their agenda for 2022 could be expected joint border demarcation, post-conflict reconstruction/humanitarian action, and eventually more in the long-term negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Co-Chairs for a final status agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh.
· The Ministerial Council decision in Stockholm in December 2021 on climate change could open more opportunities to the OSCE to work with participating states on moving ahead the climate change agenda and linking the work to the SDG 2030 agenda.
Dr. Fred Tanner
Ambassador (ret.) CCDP, The Graduate Institute, Associate Fellow, GCSP, Geneva
· The economic and political power-struggle between China and the USA will continue.
· Tensions in the Pacific region will rise and Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) will come more and more in the focus.
· The EU will continue to navigate between the two rivaling powers, trying not to jeopardize economic relations with its two biggest trading partners. But it will nevertheless aim to follow a value-based foreign policy.
· China will continue its economic policy to strengthen domestic demand and to make supply less dependent on imports from abroad. Therefore, doing business in China will get more difficult for foreign enterprises.
Politically, the Chinese government will further praise the ‘unique Chinese system’ and promote a return to ‘Chinese values’. President Xi Jinping seems firmly established. At the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in late 2022, he is expected to consolidate his position as the paramount leader of China and might even reach a new climax of his power.
Waltraut Urban
Senior Research Associate at wiiw
Iranian conservatives have rarely been able to overcome economic or diplomatic crises. Businesses in Iran are always managed by technocrats and reformists. In 2022, the government - led by conservatives - faces both economic and diplomatic crises. To resolve the issue of lifting sanctions (and increasing oil income) it is expected that the government will ultimately agree to the US-EU terms for restoring the JCPOA. However, the conservative government - which takes an anti-American approach – wants to extend and improve its relations with China and Russia aiming to solve Iran’s diplomatic and economic issues. Since Joe Biden gained office the threat of US military action has diminished. This has motivated the Iranian government to pursue an East-oriented policy intensively rather than rebuilding relations with Europe. The government relies heavily on oil income from China and its other oil consumers to appease the Iranian urban middle class, many of whom are employed in the government sector. In the absence of middle class protests, the government is able to deal with occasional protests by the lower classes, including the urban working class and traditional farmers. Therefore, economic and diplomatic crises will remain a compelling challenge for the Iranian people in 2022.
Mahnaz Zahirinejad
Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures, Polish Academy of Sciences