With special reference to the Russian war against Ukraine
Wars do not start suddenly. Most of the time, several reasons and conditions lead to the outbreak of wars. One fundamental cause is the aspiration of leaders and major parts of society to show strength, especially by adding land and/or people to their territory - or specifically by regaining lost parts. Expanding by occupying neighboring territories, recovering losses, or founding colonies abroad is the “best“ way to demonstrate leadership and importance, as well as to secure a place in history. Economic benefits are also often expected from adding foreign territories, and these potential gains serve as either a hidden or open rationale for occupying of foreign land.
Margaret MacMillan in her book “WAR - How Conflict Shaped Us“ writes: “Greed for what others have, whether it is food for survival, women for servitude or procreation, precious minerals, trade or land, has always motivated war. Hobbes said that humans fight each other ‘to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children and cattle.’“
If direct occupation and expansion are not possible or feasible, strengthening influence in foreign - often neighboring – countries, especially by using a part of its population, becomes an alternative. This will be easier if there is a part of the foreign population with ethnic, religious, and linguistic ties to its own population.
Another reason for military interventions - or at least reasoning behind them - relates to the idea of bringing “democracy, freedom etc.“ to people who are suffering under their leaders. Very often, but not always, these noble arguments just hide greed, as, in reality, countries that start a war with such reasoning are, de-facto, looking for direct economic benefits by extracting oil, gas, or other natural resources from foreign soil. Often, these wars are also intended to prevent adversaries and competitors from gaining control of these countries and their resources.
Wars are often prepared for or connected with defamation of the foreign population or at least their leaders. They are characterized as primitive, aggressive, and in any case, dangerous. This policy of defamation is used to align one’s own people with the decision to go to war and to tolerate suffering because of the war. Especially when people cannot achieve economic prosperity, the creation and designation of outside enemies help to prevent and crush domestic resistance. Very often, this strategy is used in situations where major profits are reaped by domestic oligarchs and groups supporting the ruling elite to the detriment of the general public. Instead of prosperity, people get ideology and a foreign enemy who must be beaten. This policy of defamation leads to a war society, where critics of the war are persecuted, and society is split between good, patriotic citizens on the one side and evil traitors on the other. A climate of intimidation helps to keep resistance down.
Empires come and go
If we look at the beginning of World War l, it was clearly started by the respective leaders, not with the intention to protect their own people against aggression from other European or external countries. Maybe, as Christopher Clark characterized the start of the First World War, the countries sleepwalked into the catastrophe. But it was a war started by leaders who felt either humiliated by the Sarajevo attack and/or used that incident to demonstrate power and gain additional territory and/or influence. Their aim was to change the political balance in Europe in their favor. And with the Second World War, this is even more evident. And if we add the colonial wars, again, the global competition for power and economic wealth can be clearly demonstrated and proved. And with all these wars a - partly aggressive - ideological and racist campaign accompanied the decision to start them.
Wars often lead to results contradictory to what the initiators intended. They may dissolve empires, as was the case with World War I, where the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires fell. On the other hand, new empires can be the consequence. Russia gained in these wars, especially after World War II. It managed to build up an empire across Eastern Europe with the consent of the Western allies. This empire was not dissolved by war but by rising economic deficiencies within the communist system and a peaceful revolution at the end of the 1980s.
It is certainly not easy to digest the loss of territories that have been invited into or forced into an empire, especially if the ‘mother country’ is big and suddenly deprived of important parts of its periphery. The dreams and illusions of being an empire remain, but important resources, land, people essential for other countries’ respect are lost. That was true for the United Kingdom, for Türkiye, and even more for Russia. Austria was and is too small to suffer from the loss of countries which were parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It is different for Hungary, which lost more Hungarians to neighboring countries than Austria lost German-speaking Austrians to adjacent countries. In Hungary, Prime Minister Orban often plays with nostalgia to the bigger Hungary. Austria, at least, got rid of the feeling that it should regain the position of an empire. It quickly accepted its new situation; it even believed it had to join a bigger country - Germany - to survive.
One argument or background for Brexit, put forward by different pro-Brexit politicians, was nostalgia for the British Empire and the reference to the special relations with Commonwealth countries and the former American colony, the U.S. In addition, the issue of Northern Ireland is still unresolved, at least for a part of its population.
Turkey, on the other hand, had a leader after the dissolution of its empire who answered with a staunch reform effort and partly extreme nationalism to the loss of its empire. Minorities, from the Greeks to the Kurds, suffered from this policy, just as the Armenians had suffered earlier in an even more extreme way. But, basically, Atatürk”s policy was inward-looking after the country’s basic national interests were respected in the renegotiated peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne.
Now, the neo-Ottoman policy of Tayyip Erdoğan is looking for stronger influence in Turkey’s former empire, especially in the Balkans but also in its Arab neighborhood. In this respect, Turkey’s leaders are concerned about Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and Syria to gain independence or at least strong autonomy, as these groups are partly in alliance with the Turkish PKK. Unfortunately, Turkey‘s leaders are still not able or willing to find a compromise with the domestic Kurdish representatives, leading again and again to Turkish military operations, especially in Syria.
Additionally, in recent times, Turkey has enhanced its engagement in the South Caucasus, especially on Azerbaijan’s side, to demonstrate its power. In general, Turkey under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, thinks that “Turkey/Turkiye is bigger than Turkey/Turkiye”, meaning that the Turkish government seeks to extend its direct influence beyond its national borders.
The special case of Russia
Russia had, and still has, the biggest difficulties accepting the new order after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Bloc (Comecon and Warsaw Pact). Russia waged a cruel war against the independence movements in Chechnya. Russia used and/or raised regional conflicts in and with Georgia and Moldova. The Russian support for regional conflicts was already a sign that Russia - with Putin as leader - was looking to partially reverse the consequences of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Russia wanted at least to secure a strong influence in these countries and make them dependent on Russia for major foreign policy and security issues.
For Ivan Krastev, the Russian reaction to the falling apart of the Soviet Union was also (primarily) a reaction to its shrinking population. In a paper for the Vienna-based IWM, he wrote together with Stephen Holmes: “Reversing Russia‘s negative demographic trend has been a top priority for Putin from the first day he entered the Kremlin. Since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has lost 17 million people… Conceiving demographic decline as a threat akin to total war and attributing population loss to the West‘s cultural subversion policies are the two defining features of Putin‘s political thinking.”
In this connection, one can also learn from the theories of loss. The recent book by Andreas Reckwitz “Verlust - ein Grundproblem der Moderne“ deals primarily with disappearances andlosses in families and societies but is also relevant for larger societies and political communities. The disappearance of people and/or parts of a territory does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a loss. We see this in the case of Turkey. It is a deliberate decision to interpret such a disappearance as a loss and evaluate it as something that cannot be accepted or tolerated. Such disappearances could also be interpreted as a chance for renewal and renovation.
In this connection, one should also remember the offer of the European Union to Russia for a “modernization partnership”. But such support for modernization - even if it would had been offered with more sensitivity and respect - would have prevented the establishment of the oligarchy, which ultimately gave Putin more power than a modern, democratic Russia would have done.
Also, the US - and in particular some of its neo-liberal experts like Jeffrey Sachs - showed irresponsible arrogance by advising the country to pursue extreme liberalization and privatization. Serge Schmemann, a former Moscow bureau chief for the Times, wrote recently in the New York Times: “Mr. Putin is the main culprit for Russia’s return to authoritarianism, aggression, and hostilities to the West. But American arrogance and presumptions cannot be dismissed.”
He refers to a cable sent to the US state department by an American diplomat stationed in Moscow in 1994: “If the West, with the United States in the front rank, prefers the role of economic missionary to that of true partner, we will assist Russian extremists in undermining the country’s nascent democracy and will encourage a renewal of Russia’s adversarial stance toward the outside world.”
Anyway, irrespective of the missed opportunities of the West for a new economic and political relationship with Russia, Putin chose to go another way. To stabilize the oligarchic regime, it was helpful to interpret the disappearance of Ukraine from Russian influence as a loss, and, consequently, as a threat to Russia’s identity as a great world power and an empire. A respective narrative was developed in Putin’s famous article of July 2021: “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. This article, with its “loss discourse,” presents the ideological basis for a special form of “doing loss.” In this case, it is “loss aggression” against Ukraine and all those who are held responsible for the loss: the “Nazis” inside Ukraine and the West, including NATO and the European Union. These enemies must be pushed back, beaten, and, as far as possible, destroyed - and for that purpose, a war became necessary.
Mark Galeotti, a historian who is particularly concerned with Russia, writes in his recent ‘Forged in War - A military History of Russia from its Beginnings to Today’: “Time and again, Russia’s history has by definition been a military one - not simply because of its environment and the threats and incursions of its neighbors, but also its own assumptions about the world and the limited options it believes are at its disposal… The tragedy in question - for Russia’s neighbors, of course, but also for the Russians themselves - is how far this pervasive sense of insecurity has bred a strategic culture that sees the world primarily in terms of threats and presents attack as the best means of defense.”
Yes, there are specific political and geographic conditions that define the environment Russia lives in, but in the end, the Russian leaders make deliberate decisions on how to react to these conditions, and these are primarily aggressive military actions. Russia under authoritarian leaders has not “appreciated that changing times and military-political realities mean that it is possible to get out of this vicious circle of insecurity and aggression.”
The war against Ukraine
The recent climax of those neo/imperial policies came with the Russian occupation of Crimea, the Eastern parts of Ukraine, and finally, with its outright war against Ukraine starting in February 2022. The declaration by Putin himself and many others of his followers, especially former Russian President Dimitry Medvedev, made it clear that Putin’s Russia is not accepting that Ukraine is a sovereign country. Its population has no right to decide about its own government or alliances. It is a clear case of a colonial war with the aim of destroying Ukraine‘s existence as a sovereign country. Whatever mistakes have been made by the West, in particular by NATO and the European Union, the fact that Russia wages an aggressive war cannot be put in question.
As the outspoken European philosopher Slavoj Žižek expressed it in “The Perverted Normality of War (and Peace)”: “Russia brutally attacks Ukraine, but many commentators are searching for the ‘complexity’ behind the attack. Yes, for sure, there is complexity there, but the basic fact remains: Russia did it.”
If we look to the complexities referred to by Slavoj Žižek, we should mention the lack of a comprehensive new peace and cooperation order after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. It was obvious that the West wanted to give full support to the independence of the former countries which had been part of the Soviet empire - directly or indirectly. The London Declaration of NATO 1990 underlined the defensive character of NATO and expressed the hope for a new, cooperative relationship with the still-existing Soviet Union: “Our alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.” And the declaration argues for a stronger role of the OSCE.
Could more have been undertaken by the West in opening channels of dialogue with Russia? Probably yes, but one should not forget that the Eastern European countries, due to many bad experiences, wanted to get rid of Russian influence and dependence on decisions taken in Moscow. As the German historian Andreas Rödder writes in his book ‘Der Verlorene Frieden’: “To renounce NATO enlargement would have pleased Russian interests as Great Power, but contradicted the security interests of the East- and Central European states. De facto the situation of the Yalta agreement of 1945, as Stalin declared East, Central, and Southeast Europe as Russian influence zone, would have been perpetuated.”
Nevertheless, a more innovative and creative approach offering closer cooperation by EU and especially NATO, parallel to NATO enlargement, might have helped to easy the pains of a Russia of an empire. But it is only a guess.
It is often neglected that it was not only the US who was reluctant, but especially the countries who suffered under “Moscow” and feared renewed interference by the former master. Living in a new economic, political and defense community - free from Russian influence - was an act of liberation. Anyway, the quick transition from cooperation with NATO and EU to an aggressive hybrid war directly against Ukraine and indirectly against the West, as well as an authoritarian, often brutal regime domestically, demonstrate that Putin’s decision to wage war is deeply embedded in his personal ambitions and in a part of Russian society, at least in its powerful oligarchy. What we see is a brutalization of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy that concerns primarily the war against Ukraine but also different activities of mercenaries in Africa. As mentioned above, the decision to go for an aggressive loss discourse and, finally, war was a deliberate choice by Putin.
In view of this brutalization pushed forward by President Putin, the arguments that NATO expansion was a major cause for Russia‘s war against Ukraine loses conviction. Certainly, the vague decision of the Bucharest NATO summit 2008 concerning Ukraine and Georgia was not very helpful. But it is unclear if an outright promise of membership or not mentioning this possibility at all would have prevented the Russian aggression.
The same is true with the argument that Ukraine could have avoided the war by declaring itself neutral. First of all, Ukraine was neutral and lifted the status of neutrality only after Russia illegally annexed Crimea. Neutrality did not prevent Russia from invading the country. Russia, furthermore, did not respect and keep its promises under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and it did not respect the promises of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In both cases, Russia promised to respect international borders, specifically the borders of Ukraine. For an aggressive leadership like the one under Vladimir Putin, it would not have been difficult to violate Ukraine’s neutrality. Putin could easily find an argument that the Nazis in Kyiv are violating the neutrality status. Russia showed that it is acts according to the principle “Where there’s is a Will, there is a Way”. And he wanted that war.
What is certainly to be observed if the question of peace between Russia and Ukraine is raised is that a new idea of a sustainable European peace order must also be on the agenda. As the recent paper of the International Crisis Group states: “But ‘land for peace’ proposals tend to see the war narrowly as a territorial dispute between Moscow and Kyiv, while Russia views it as a war in which it is taking on the entire West in a bid for its security. In Moscow‘s view, dominating Ukraine is critical to our defense from a hostile, US-lead transatlantic order. This view of the West also leads Russia to have ambitions that extend Ukraine to revising the post-Cold War order in Europe. It thinks it must do so to increase its sway over the continent and weaken US influence.” The Russian aggression is also, in that sense, a hybrid one, as it is directed against an independent Ukraine and the West as such. In this respect, it is directed against a U.S. led West - especially concerning the military side - and against a European Union based on national sovereignty and cooperation to defend common interests.
Violation of sovereignty or cooperation
Recognizing the sovereignty of countries, including their sovereign decisions to join an economic, political, or defense (!) community, is the basis of peace and security. Once countries interfere in other countries’ sovereign decisions or do not accept and recognize the country’s existence, peace is endangered, and war will be imminent. Any kind of changing borders should be negotiated bilaterally and internationally. This is also true for the case of Kosovo, which is often presented as an argument against this principle. Irrespective of the different history, Kosovo was brought before the United Nations, and Martti Ahtisaari was asked to look into the case, presenting a report. And still, the EU and US are negotiating with Serbia and Kosovo to find an agreement acceptable to both sides. The case of Kosovo rather confirms the principle that borders should be changed through negotiations and with the engagement of international community.
This principled attitude should be the guideline for a mature international community. Russia’s attitude toward Ukraine - especially its brutal war - Israel’s refusal to accept the UN decision to found a Palestinian State alongside its own, and its violations of the Lebanese and Syrian sovereignty, Iran’s refusal to recognize Israel’s existence and its indirect interference into Lebanon‘s domestic policies, all violate the basic principles of peaceful coexistence. The same applies to the U.S. intervention in Iraq and other countries, as well as Iraq’s war against Iran and its occupation of Kuwait. The more brute force takes precedence over law, and the more authoritarian rule overrides democracy, the more wars will become reality.
The alternative to interference in other countries’ domestic affairs – and, in extreme cases, waging aggressive war - is to pursue peaceful cooperation and adhere to international law. That was the great achievement after the two catastrophic world wars: the creation of the United Nations, other multilateral organizations, and regional bodies such as the OSCE and the European Union, which serve as platforms for dialogue, dispute resolution, and conflict prevention. Ignoring these institutions and their principles leads to a Hobbesian world: “The condition of man… is a condition of war of everyone against everyone.” It is a world in which the powerful and forceful dictate peace and war. As Andrei Kolesnikow recently wrote in ‘Foreign Affairs’ in his article “The Cold War Putin Wants,”…the world is now hostage to the three unpredictable and dangerous leaders: Putin, Trump, and Xi.”
One of the most powerful forces openly showing contempt for international law and his imperial aspirations is the old and new U.S. President, Donald Trump. Trump is not satisfied with the size and influence of the United States. With that, he shares a mindset with some of the founding fathers of the U.S.
As historian Greg Grandin recently wrote in ‘The New York Times - International Edition’ under the headline “Trump Dreams of a New American Empire”: “’Extend the sphere,’ wrote James Madison in 1787; increase the ‘extent of territory,’ and you’ll diffuse political extremism and stave off class warfare.” Similarly, Thomas Jefferson argued that the larger the country, “the less will it be shaken by local passions.”
Today, Trump – alongside Elon Musk – is extending these aspirations beyond Earth, even towards Mars – ironically named after the god of war and military power – under the guise of ensuring peace.
It is interesting that already in the early times of the United States, the expansion of its territory was also seen as a possibility for reducing domestic tensions and strife. And it seems that some supporters of Donald Trump in the U.S. also today see the longing for new territories as a possibility for overcoming internal divisions in the U.S. society. Trump is, in this respect, in line with Putin and Xi, as all three expect that new territories will be helpful in stabilizing their power and domestic support. That means for the world, as Greg Grandin underlines, that: ”… mutualism is not the world’s new organizing principle, and that the doctrine of conquest, thought to have expired, is still valid.” And he adds: “The powerful do what they will; the weak suffer what they must.”
In this respect, it is interesting to notice what Mark Galeotti remarks about historical similarities between Russia and the United States. ”Russia and the United States may frequently be geopolitical poles apart, but there are some ways in which they are similar, not least in the way their histories have been shaped by the scope for expansion over what must have sometimes felt like infinite territories, subject to having to deal with often-inconvenient locals.”
It is an open question how the European Union will deal with this “new world order where aggression is expected”. How will the EU react if Trump and Putin agree on the future of Ukraine, which many in Europe would regard as a “dirty agreement”. How will the EU react if Trump aggresses Greenland and tries to absorb a European territory? How will the European Union, but also countries like Egypt and Jordan, react if Trump - in alliance with Netanyahu - insists on his plan to get all Palestinians out of Gaza? A world where “aggression is expected” will be an extremely dangerous world, and wars will become more likely -unless the other parts of the world try to give multilateralism and cooperation a new impetus.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.