It is now ten years since the European Union underwent its last enlargement: after long negotiations, Croatia became a member of the EU on July 1st, 2013. At the time, the governments of several EU member states were skeptical of or even opposed to the enlargement process. As rapporteur of the European Parliament for Croatia’s accession, I sought to positively influence the political climate in such countries to gain the necessary support.
Among such countries was Slovenia, which for an extended time expressed clear opposition to Croatia’s accession so long as Zagreb did not accept Ljubljana’s position on their land and sea borders. In the Netherlands too, there were strong doubts about the rule of law in Croatia and its commitment to fighting corruption. France also expressed a general skepticism toward any enlargement.
Within the European Parliament, some opposition could also be detected, but in the end I was able to consolidate strong although not unanimous support for my report asking the member states to accept the negotiation results. The resolution I proposed received 564 yes votes, 38 no votes, and 32 abstentions. Formal negotiations were between Croatia and the existing EU member states, so the European Commission was de facto leading the talks. However, the European Parliament accompanied the Commission and had the final say.
Evaluating Croatia’s EU Membership
Ten years are too short to complete a comprehensive evaluation on the success of the EU’s most recent enlargement process. But without a doubt, Croatia has become an active and successful member of the EU. Over the past ten years, Croatia has introduced the euro as its official currency and has joined the Schengen Area.
However, it is possible that the expectations for Croatia’s role concerning the countries of the Western Balkans were greater than it could or even desired to fulfill. Croatia has repeatedly entered into disputes with Serbia – enhanced by nationalists on both sides. Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, while Kosovo – especially under the Albin Kurti government – is not ready to implement the obligations of past governments. For its part, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been unable to develop a clear accession strategy due to internal conflicts. Meanwhile, Montenegro must still reposition itself after the electoral defeat of its long-term president Milo Djukanovic. The country is also characterized by disputes concerning its political orientation towards the EU versus Russia. North Macedonia – after solving its longstanding dispute with Greece – has been confronted with new obstacles by Bulgaria.
Thus, it has not been easy to bring new dynamics into the enlargement issue, even if Croatia would have liked to do so. Neither the countries of the region – with the exception of Albania and, for some time, North Macedonia – nor EU member countries themselves have been consistently committed to the enlargement process. Thus, the promises and expectations raised at the Thessaloniki Summit twenty years ago have been not realized. On the side of EU members and on the side of de facto and de jure candidates, there was and continues to be a lack of willingness to prepare seriously for the next round of enlargements.
Ukraine brings new challenges
The situation has grown even more complicated with clear promises by the EU to Ukraine, Moldova, and – under some conditions – Georgia. It is not yet clear if the EU’s support for Ukraine’s accession has strengthened its readiness to fulfill the promises it made to the countries of the Western Balkans or, perhaps, if it has even slowed it down. If the EU is ready for the accession of all current candidates, it would be necessary to organize this “Big Bang” carefully. It must be a thoroughly considered process whereby the enlargement and deepening of the EU must go hand-in-hand. Unfortunately, the past twenty years since the Thessaloniki Summit have not be used for such preparations.
For the EU, creating a comprehensive union that maintains a democratic decision-making process will be difficult but nevertheless necessary. The EU requires majority voting in foreign and security issues while at the same time requiring a consultation and decision mechanism that prevents some members from being permanently overruled. Due to challenges coming from an imperialist Russia, the EU also needs a strong military component.
Either way, Ukraine’s accession must not transform the EU into a predominantly anti-Russian or militarized union. While the EU must respect Ukraine’s suffering under the ongoing Russian invasion and occupation as well as help Ukraine to defend itself successfully and later rebuild, a new, stable pan-European order must be envisaged for the future. This order must include consultation mechanisms with Russia with the aim of preventing a resurgence of military conflicts and wars. Russia, with all the crimes it has committed, must not be the permanent enemy of the EU. For Ukrainian society too, a new, pragmatic modus vivendi must be found – at least in the long run – as hard as this may be.
How successful were past enlargements?
Before entering a new period of enlargement, the EU should evaluate how successful the last enlargements were – both for the EU and its new member countries. Of course, it is always difficult to differentiate between enlargement as such and other internal and external factors and influences. However, it is possible to conclude that past EU accessions were helpful in stabilizing democracy in new member countries. From Greece, Spain, and Portugal in the south to the EU’s later enlargements in the east, this finding can certainly be supported.
For the moment, however, Poland and Hungary are exceptions to this trend. It is true that in these two countries, elections still do take place. But Hungary has passed electoral laws that make a change of government exceptionally difficult. Moreover, the Hungarian government’s control of the media serves as a tool to restrict opposition activities. In Poland, we have witnessed an unbelievable attempt to exclude possible opposition candidates from participating due to past “political mistakes.” A new scrutiny commission will decide who can run for prominent political positions. Such a commission recalls the system of Iran and other formally “democratic” countries to prevent unwelcome voices from gaining power.
In a recent opinion piece in the New York Times titled “Illiberalism is thriving in Poland,” Jarolaw Kuisz and Karolina Wigura write: “For much of the party’s eight years in office, migrants, women and sexual minorities have been the chief targets. The government also attacks the opposition, often in luridly conspiratorial terms.” The same is true for Hungary. Unfortunately, in some older EU member states, we can also observe similar tendencies. But – at least for now – there seem to be enough forces of resistance to prevent these “illiberal” forces from gaining a majority at elections.
Concerning economic development, a recent study completed by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation came to the following conclusion: “Our study shows substantial opportunities for EU-CEE in a greener, digitized, and more automated world. EU-CEE compares reasonably well with Western Europe in many areas, and even where it does lag behind, the gaps are not necessarily big.” What is needed is a clear focus on digitization and the green economy as well as policies to combat emigration. Addressing demographic decline is as necessary as building an effective state that mobilizes available resources.
Examining the political, economic, and social aspects of most countries that acceded in the last rounds of EU enlargement, one must come to a positive conclusion. But there are notable deficiencies – especially concerning democratic backsliding – in several member countries. Nationalism and illiberalism are consistently working against the basic ideas and values that the EU was built upon. But to be fair, these tendencies can also be observed in older member countries – even in some founding members.
The EU’s capacity is in danger
Preserving democracy does not always lead to political stability. In several countries, such stability is lacking – which is once again true for some “old” member countries too. But as long as democracy is functioning, this political instability – such as the ongoing crisis in Bulgaria – can be digested by the country itself and the EU as a whole. Nevertheless, we should be aware of increasing instability and right-wing, anti-EU parties that may endanger the EU’s capacity to solve both internal and external problems.
The EU’s strong support for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression is as dependent on this capacity as the transformation of our economies and societies to combat climate change. If the slogan of “my country first” gains momentum, any strategy to defend the EU’s interests and influence global development will fail. Such nationalist attitudes towards the EU also undermines its appeal for new members. Such attitudes put not only the EU’s Ukraine strategy at stake but also its climate policies, as some right-wing parties reject the implementation of decisions taken by the European Council or the European Parliament.
Contested values
It is probably not enlargement as such that brought new dangers to EU unity. Anti-EU tendencies can be observed in the EU’s core member countries – primarily on the far-right but also at times on the far-left. In addition, there is a danger that with delayed accession processes, the positive attitudes towards the EU and its value among candidate countries will lessen. We have already observed in some candidate countries decreasing support for EU membership – sometimes in parallel to increasing influence by Russia and/or China. This further increases opposition in EU member countries that fear new anti-EU influences.
One such alliance is evident in the close cooperation between Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic. Both leaders have similar attitudes towards the freedom of press and Russia’s role in Ukraine. Such an alliance within the EU would be explosive. In this respect, a candidate country’s position towards the war in Ukraine and Russia’s responsibility should be an important criterion in judging a country’s readiness to contribute to the construction of a new democratic and liberal Europe.
But, needless to say, a candidate country’s attitude towards Russia’s aggression cannot be the only criterion for accession. The Copenhagen criteria in its extended interpretation – which were used to evaluate the readiness of Croatia for its EU accession – must be upheld for future enlargements. For Ukraine itself and the Western Balkan countries, rule of law, the fight against corruption, and democratic principles must serve as the measuring rod for accession.
The readiness of candidate countries to reduce existing tensions and work on solving regional or even domestic conflicts should also be decisive. One special case is Kosovo. Time and again, Serbia has used Kosovo’s Serb minority to increase bilateral tensions. Unfortunately, Vucic has found a partner in Kurti in the negative sense. Both instrumentalize existing tensions for their domestic purposes. While it is obvious that radical Serbs in the north of Kosovo are not ready to play a constructive role, Kurti has added fuel to the fire. His refusal to implement past agreements – such as the agreement to create a federation of Serb communities – is not helping to reduce tensions or restart relations between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians or between Serbia and Kosovo. In this respect, an enlargement strategy that progressively connects all the countries of the Western Balkans with the EU could give the EU stronger leverage – with both sticks and carrots.
Staged integration
Twenty years after the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, it is time to learn from the EU’s past enlargements and its subsequent lack of progress since Croatia’s accession. We must find ways to prevent countries, to the greatest extent possible, from reneging on their promises to abide by EU values and principles after accession. Certainly, there is never a guarantee against such a reversal or backsliding. But a staged integration process – however defined – could provide clear support for all domestic forces that fight for the implementation of EU principles and values – before and after accession. There must be close cooperation between EU institutions and domestic civil society in creating a sound basis for democratic development. This should be emphasized from the first stages of integration. The EU should leave behind its “wait and see” approach and instead involve candidates in a staged integration process whereby all countries must prove their willingness to accept the EU’s values and rules – not only by passing the respective laws but also by implementing them.
All the candidate countries would immediately become part of the EU family, but their rights and obligations would depend on their readiness to implement the necessary reforms. In addition, a country’s integration would depend on its willingness to solve domestic and regional conflicts. Thus, it is in the hands of the candidate countries themselves if and when they can proceed in the integration process by earning new rights and additional financial support. Full voting rights would only be provided at the end of the integration process. But by already being a member of the family and sitting at the same table – even with less rights – the candidates would have demonstrated a clear commitment to move towards EU integration. Moreover, the EU and its member states would give a clear signal that the process of integration has already begun.
Before the negotiations with Croatia were concluded, there was a discussion about whether an observation period concerning the implementation of the rule of law, the fight against corruption and other factors – similar to the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism utilized for the accession process of Bulgaria and Romania – should be part of Croatia’s accession agreement. But such a mechanism could never reverse the accession and thus had no real teeth. In this respect, a staged accession could and should have mechanisms that would make advancement in the accession process dependent on progress in the implementation of the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and other areas. It could even include a mechanism to demote a country and move it back it to an earlier stage of integration, as necessary.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.