In the framework of the recent Belgrade Security Conference, I participated in the opening panel titled „Ukraine and the Allies: Keeping the Firm Rock Unity and Solidarity.“ In my remarks, I aimed to broaden the scope of the panel and proposed a set of principles for a common European future, with special reference to the issue of security. I have attempted to summarize and distil my core ideas and arguments in the following.
Ukraine’s path towards peace and security
No one yet knows how and when the horrible war that Russia started against Ukraine will end. Nor does anyone know the extent of what a Russian defeat might entail. However, any thinking about the future of Europe and Ukraine must be predicated on the determination and conviction that Russia – or the Russia of Vladimir Putin – must be defeated and that its principle aims will not be achieved. However, regardless of how the war ends, Ukraine requires a new security arrangement – in military terms as well as economic and political terms – for its future safety.
The political and economic security – and eventual growth – of Ukraine can be achieved through its membership in the EU, while NATO membership would be the strongest guarantee of its military security. NATO membership for Ukraine would provide the greatest deterrence from a future invasion by Russia while also serving as a guarantee to Russia that there will be no revenge attacks launched from Ukraine into its territory. Most likely, Europe will still be left with some contested territories between Ukraine and Russia after any armistice or peace agreement. As a result, Europe will have to work together on international agreements and supervision to prevent the continuation of fighting over any disputed territories. In the long term, a “permanent“ solution might be found, but in the coming years it is most important to end the fighting.
What remains to be seen is the type of country Ukraine will be when it enters NATO and the EU. The war has already generated – and will continue to generate – deeply consequential changes to the size and constitution of the Ukrainian population. How many refugees will return from their exodus during and after the war? How many Ukrainians will be wounded – physically and psychologically? How will reconstruction efforts proceed? What kind of political divisions will arise, and will corruption resurface during the country’s reconstruction?
Challenges for the EU
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU has demonstrated a surprisingly strong level of resilience and support for Ukraine. However, this solidarity could soon change, with discontent increasing among EU voters as a result of high inflation and increased migration. These issues threaten to weaken support for Ukraine, as recently occurred in the recent Slovak elections. EU citizens will increasingly demand that their politicians pay more attention to their own immediate interests and needs, rather than supporting Ukraine.
In addition to the EU’s provision of immediate financial assistance, Ukraine’s demand to join the EU may also face growing opposition. As it pertains to EU enlargement more broadly, there is a preexisting fatigue among many member states. The accession of Ukraine as well as the six countries of the Western Balkans, Moldova, and perhaps Georgia – and even Armenia – may pose a huge challenge. This can already be seen in the growing opposition to Ukrainian grain exports into the EU, even by one of Ukraine’s staunchest supporters, Poland. Moreover, the EU must grapple with the significant financial burden that would result from the accession of a member state as large and as poor as Ukraine.
A new approach to enlargement
Without fail, the EU must organize the next round (or rounds) of enlargement differently from those of the past. Different proposals are currently being discussed, such as the concept of staged enlargement, elaborated by institutes in Brussels and Belgrade. In addition, the concept of differentiated integration will have to be revived. Ukraine could not be considered for full or immediate integration into the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy or its Cohesion Fund. There will be many other issues that arise during accession negotiations. At the same time, the long accession processes of the Western Balkan countries have been characterized by very gradual steps towards implementing the necessary reforms for aligning with EU rules and regulations (the acquis communautaire). In some countries, the opposite has even occurred – steps in the direction of authoritarianism and restrictions in civil liberties and media freedom, which are not compatible with EU accession. Unfortunately, some EU member states have also gone in that direction after their accessions.
Simultaneously, the EU itself requires several changes in its current functioning to prepare itself for enlargement, such as moving away from unanimity in matters of foreign affairs towards majority voting. Certainly, this must be done with sensibility and the necessary precautions in order to avoid the creation of new dividing lines and internal conflicts that might weaken the EU’s international standing. Regardless, the EU’s foreign policy must be overhauled and strengthened. The EU needs a true EU foreign minister, even if this might entail a significant sacrifice for some governments.
A new foreign policy strategy
In addition to creating a unified foreign minister, the EU also needs a new foreign policy strategy that, on one hand, designates a peace and security policy for Europe and, on the other, outlines a new differentiated policy toward the Global South. Concerning peace and security, the EU requires a strong military dimension – with and parallel to NATO. Next year, it will be 70 years since a courageous step to reorganize Europe failed. The European Defence Community agreed between Germany and France was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954. Things would have developed differently if this Community would have been at the core of the European unification process. However, a strong defence policy is only one element of a viable security policy.
Efforts to lay the foundations for a comprehensive European peace structure is another important element of a future EU foreign and security policy. With Russia as it is today, such a peace may seem nearly impossible, but we must prepare ourselves for a future with a different Russia. Moreover, many citizens already aspire for such a new world – even if it could only be established in the distant future. Certainly, there are different and even contradicting attitudes towards a comprehensive peace policy for Europe as a whole. In this respect, Europe must now begin to discuss how a new security and peace architecture can be organized – with alternative scenarios, depending on developments in Russia.
Concerning the second task, it has grown increasingly obvious that Western/European views and concepts of the world order are very different from those of many other countries in the Global South. As evident in the varying attitudes and positions of countries in the Global South towards the war in Ukraine, such differences have become increasingly consequential. Many countries of the Global South do not share the West’s view, or – even if they do recognize that Russia is responsible for the war – they did not follow the West’s sanctions policy. What the EU needs is a drastically more efficient and robust strategy to find ways of cooperation with the countries of the Global South. Strong support for and adherence to universal values, as interpreted by the West – and especially the EU – must be combined with a more pragmatic and less moralizing policy towards the outside world.
A broader concept of security
The EU must choose its cooperation partners and allies according to its own needs. In this respect, peace and security must be on the top of its list of priorities. The EU will only gain the necessary support for a stronger and more active foreign and security policy if it can convince its own citizens that such a policy is fundamental for their security. In democracies, the basic consent of the public is paramount for an effective foreign policy. In the long run, neither the EU’s enlargement nor its foreign policy goals can be achieved without the consent of its citizens. In this respect, not enough efforts have been undertaken in recent years, and the EU’s support for Ukraine may suffer for it.
But security must also be interpreted in a broader sense. Security necessarily includes a military dimension. But it must include economic, social, and environmental security. That means that all elements of human security must be within the focus of the EU’s security policy. Support for Ukraine and the rejection of the present Russian concept of security – which neglects many aspects of human security – must also be part of a comprehensive security strategy.
Russia seeks to occupy – or perhaps destroy – an entire country and its population. It uses convicted criminals to strengthen its military power. It abducts Ukrainian children for “re-education.” It has waged a war that has killed thousands of innocent people and created an environmental disaster. It finances its war by selling its reserves of oil and gas, irrespective of the consequences for the climate. Nor is it a supporter of the energy transition as a vital part of a global climate policy. At home, it restricts and abolishes basic freedoms and rights. It promotes a retrograde concept of the family and women’s rights. On a global level, Russia aspires to export its model as a counterweight to the Western “decadent” model. Domestically and in its foreign policy, Putin’s Russia is diametrically opposed to the model of the West – especially the EU – and is actively working to destroy the European „way of life,“ especially by spreading fake news and election interference.
However, it is true that such tendencies also exist within EU candidate countries and member states alike. As a result, it is vital to emphasize the danger of this model while recognizing – depending on each country and government – the unique shortcomings of states in achieving the model defined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and other foundational documents.
The EU – and especially its progressive forces – must argue with a firm conviction against both Putin’s Russia as well as internal right-wing populist forces that promote ideologies in line with Russia’s official doctrine. The EU must continue to promote and ensure the implementation of all values and promises outlined in its treaties. The recent elections in Poland are one small sign of hope.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 and then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.