What does the new reality in Nagorno-Karabakh mean for the future of the conflict and the South Caucasus region? Is further military escalation still possible? What role do external powers, such as Russia, Turkey, and the EU, play in this conflict and the South Caucasus region more broadly? What is the situation of Karabakh Armenians today? Why are the violent means of taking control over Nagorno-Karabakh perceived as restoring justice in Azerbaijan? Are there any prospects for a genuine dialogue between the conflicting parties? Can the EU play a role in supporting efforts towards a sustainable solution and preventing further violence? This panel of eminent experts will attempt to answer these and many other questions surrounding the deep-rooted conflict in this part of the European neighborhood.

On November 9th, 2023, the EU Commission presented its yearly enlargement report. The beginning of its communication states: “Today, the Western Balkans, Türkiye, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have a historic window of opportunity to strongly bind their future to the European Union.” The Commission also cited the conclusions of the European Council at its meeting in Granada, at which “EU leaders reconfirmed enlargement as a geo-strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity.“ 

Baku and Yerevan have failed to reach a peace treaty in the wake of the 2020 Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan’s lighting operation to take over Karabakh on September 19, 2023. This failure is due to two fundamental issues. First, both Yerevan and Baku have been in search of a silver bullet to make peace and resolve all their problems once and for all. Second, they have sought such a silver bullet in different capitals, from Moscow to Washington, from Ankara to Brussels and Paris. Instead, they should accept that either no such silver bullet exists or, if it does, it lies in small, tangible steps, uneasy concessions, and slow and long processes of reconciliation and conflict transformation that require them both to capitalize on their own potential for peace. In this context, the Armenian-Azerbaijani joint statement on prisoner exchanges and other confidence-building measures is a good illustration.

Das abgelaufene Jahr war wahrlich kein friedliches. Der zerstörerische Krieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine ging weiter und die Hamas startete mit einem unentschuldbaren und grausamen Angriff gegen Israel einen neuen Krieg bzw. das Wiederaufleben immer wieder aufflammender kriegerischer Auseinandersetzung. Für beide Kriege besteht zu Beginn des Neuen Jahres kaum Aussicht auf ein Ende  - jedenfalls auf keine dauerhafte Lösung. 

One of the last bus convoys carrying Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians arrived in Armenia during the first week of October. Armenia’s southernmost region Syunik is currently serving as a refuge for thousands. Community centers and hotels are full, as people are left to make sense of the situation and think about how to get out of the current predicament. Over 100,000 Armenians have left Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the United Nations, the remaining Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh is now fewer than 1,000 individuals.

Three months ago, hopes were high that Armenia and Azerbaijan were close to signing a peace agreement by the end of 2023. The logic behind this was the narrative that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the fate of the Armenian population were the main obstacles to the peace agreement. After the military takeover of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan in September 2023, what could else hinder the peace process? Everything was ready to finalize the agreement during a meeting in Granada on October 5, and then sign the peace deal in Brussels or Washington by the end of 2023.