"The breakdown of the Soviet empire—including the Soviet Union itself—and the collapse of communist regimes in Europe gave rise to hope, especially in Europe, that a new era of peace and stability had been reached. Even for those who did not believe in Francis Fukuyama’s 'End of History,' a sense of optimism prevailed.
But then came the financial crisis, COVID-19, and above all, the Russian attack—or better, attacks on—Ukraine. Recently, another full-blown war broke out and brought death and destruction to the Middle East. And in-between, a smaller but important conflict awoke and brought new turmoil to the South Caucasus.
Internal changes in voters' decisions accompany external challenges. Migration—especially its irregular form—has brought strong gains for anti-European and anti-migration parties. Perhaps, with stronger representation in the national parliaments and the European Parliament, these parties will become less anti-European, but their concept of Europe is authoritarian, inward-looking, and isolationist. Geopolitics is not on their mind—except for the willingness to join the club of authoritarian-ruled countries. Authoritarian connections across national borders are the only globalization accepted and promoted by nationalists.
The re-emergence of Russian imperialism
The Russian war against Ukraine challenged the capacity of the European Union to act clearly and collectively. Overall, the organization and mobilization of support for Ukraine were done surprisingly quickly and efficiently. Nevertheless, it showed the weakness of European military capacities, because Europe—and Ukraine—have and must rely strongly on American support. In the meantime, the support of the US after the elections is no longer certain. In any case, the European peace dividend has been consumed, and a new armament cycle is starting, placing heavy burdens on European taxpayers.
Inside the EU, the number of people voting in national elections and for the European Parliament for parties who show either sympathy with Russia or at least want their countries to remain neutral is increasing. But the 'neutrality' of the U.S. and/or the European Union means victory for Russia. And it is interesting that the right wing, which was always aggressively militaristic, is for now 'peace-oriented' and is even denying Ukraine the right to defend itself.
Irrespective of these changes in attitude, it seems that Ukraine will not be able to win the war and save its full territorial sovereignty. But it must be clear that any decisive transfer of territory means victory for Russia and defeat for Ukraine and its supporters. And the question is: what will happen afterwards? What kind of security guarantees for Ukraine—inside or outside NATO—can be arranged? Is a promise to deliver sophisticated weapons in case of renewed aggression enough? The doubts about different kinds of guarantees are found on both sides, in Russia and in NATO countries. But without efficient and reliable military support for Ukraine, there will be no peace—or only peace with Ukraine swallowed by Russia.
In any case, the war against Ukraine has brought difficult challenges for the EU and its still fragile unity. But we have to be aware that talks about a ceasefire and peace with Russia will bring new challenges and disputes inside the European Union. The recent response formulated by the Polish and Baltic ambassadors in Berlin to demands from some politicians in Germany for peace talks demonstrates a wide gap inside the EU in the approach to ending the war. But a geopolitical Union cannot only insist on morality; it must also consider Realpolitik. Both elements must be part of any efficient strategy.
Middle East
The vicious Hamas attack against Israeli civilians on October 7th started a new horrific and disastrous war in the Middle East. Of course, the Hamas attack was not the beginning but a cruel highlight of the ongoing Middle East conflict.
Israel’s reaction goes far beyond a justified reaction and self-defense. The right-wing extremists in Israel try to solve the Middle East conflicts once and for all with military means. And it can destroy many of its enemies without having to fear an equivalent reaction—at least as long as Iran or any other country—except for Israel—does not have the atomic bomb. But how long will this be the case? Certainly, Israel’s show of force and violence will enhance Iran’s efforts to build the bomb. And it may strengthen the cooperation between Iran and Russia, as Iran is an important ally for Russia in the region.
Obviously, the trauma suffered by many Israeli families and the population as a whole due to the Hamas attack is enormous. But so is the death toll among civilians in Gaza and Lebanon, and it certainly will lead to long-lasting hatred among the respective populations. And still, there is no plan presented by this government for how to come to a solution and give Palestinians basic rights in their own homeland. One cannot avoid the impression that the present Israeli leadership wants to destroy not only the leadership and infrastructure of Hamas and Hezbollah but—as is openly announced—occupy additional foreign land in Gaza and evict its population.
It must be added that the network of political movements and militias supported and influenced by Iran is co-responsible for the Middle East turmoil. Their permanent—mostly unsuccessful—actions against Israel not only threatened Israeli citizens but also gave Israel’s governments the chance to argue for their extreme policies. Iran itself and its allies were not ready to accept the existence of Israel and to find at least a modus vivendi for living together. Of course, the Trump policy of canceling the nuclear deal was a disaster and further exacerbated the critical situation in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, the West was not able or willing to act united and decisively for a settlement of the prime conflicts and to implement the UN resolution of 1947, which created two states. Even in the rare cases when the EU had a clear and stronger position in favor of creating and recognizing a Palestinian state, the US blocked these ideas.
Nevertheless, if the EU wants to take a minimum of responsibility in its immediate neighborhood, it must act now. There is no excuse for staying passive and uttering just some non-consequential sentences. And there is no excuse for the hypocrisy and double standards in the EU's reactions to events in Ukraine on the one side and the Middle East on the other side—as different as the causes and origins of the two wars are. In any case, there is the right of self-defense, and that must be respected. However, the violation of international humanitarian laws cannot be accepted in either case.
This double standard is noted outside the EU, especially by the Third World. But without being accepted as an actor with principles, the Global South cannot be won as an ally. And we need them, especially when we want their help in convincing Russia to stop its aggression in Ukraine. And we need Arab states if we want to help solve the conflicts in the Middle East.
The South Caucasus
The recent conflict and short war between Azerbaijan and Armenia was to be expected. The question was not “if” but “when” Baku would act. The Russian war against Ukraine was certainly “inviting” Azerbaijan to act in the shadow of this war. But—independently of the time Baku chose to go to war—the occupation of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia could not be recognized and accepted forever.
This must be recognized irrespective of the injustices that have been committed from whichever side in the past decades. It is particularly deplorable that Azerbaijan retaliated by evicting Armenians from Nagorno Karabakh and had no interest in a common future for its population—irrespective of its ethnic origin. It would require more effort to overcome the wounds of the past and create a future not only without war but with mutual understanding and cooperation.
The whole situation is still fragile as many open questions about how to organize a geographically complicated and interlinked neighborhood remain unsolved. In addition, the conflict between Turkey and Armenia and the interests of Iran are still to be dealt with if stability is to be brought to the region. For the time being, Russia has other main issues to deal with but is still part of the game.
The South Caucasus is typically a region that cannot overcome and solve its open issues alone. But with the absence of active engagement from bigger neighbors or even the lack of interest from these neighbors to solve the respective issues, no progress can be made. Europe reacted but perhaps too cautiously; it can’t bring peace itself. This is another reason why—despite many grievances—Europe must enhance its diplomatic engagement in the region, especially with Turkey.
Is a geopolitical EU possible?
The basic problems the European Union has with its geopolitical aspirations are manifold. The predominance of national interests and the lack of readiness to define and implement common policies are obstacles to a geo-strategic EU. It is important, however, to see the basic difference between the European Union’s attitude after centuries of conflicts and wars and the interests and actions of nations that are still clinging to crude power politics. They are not up for compromise and peaceful neighborhoods by accepting existing borders.
They want to regain power, influence, and even territory in the case of Russia, or they want to play the global number one role in the case of China. On the other hand, Europe is confronted with the US, which, at least under Trump, wants to make America Great Again and is not promoting international cooperation and multilateralism. The US as the main EU partner has a volatile policy and has lost influence—even if it still has military and economic strength that the EU is missing.
The difficult task for the EU will be to keep its philosophy of idealism, including respecting and promoting human rights, and combine it with realism and accepting other countries' different attitudes toward human rights, including individual rights inside their societies. The hope that a new and—at least in principle—idealistic policy can be successfully implemented in a world of Realpolitik has been smashed. Whatever conflict or war we want to end, Europe needs “allies” to help. And very often, they will neither show adherence to values we respect nor be democratically governed.
Furthermore, if the European Union wants to end the war against Ukraine, discussions with Russia’s leader, whoever that is, will be necessary. To end the conflict in the Middle East and prepare for peace and a new order, the EU must speak with authoritarian governments in the region, including those of Iran and Saudi Arabia. To help overcome the conflict in the South Caucasus, a dialogue with leaders of authoritarian Azerbaijan and Turkey is necessary. It is hard to accept that geopolitics must include more Realpolitik than would be compatible with adherence to the EU’s core values.
Economic integration, the European social model, the insistence on implementing human rights, and a progressive climate policy are necessary elements of the European integration process. But unfortunately, they are not enough to resist military aggression. Now, even inside the European Union, these elements of a value-oriented approach to building a new Europe are increasingly questioned by a strengthened and extreme right wing. So, it requires double efforts and convincing arguments in the dialogue with citizens to approach a geopolitical Europe. European politicians must elaborate on how important it is not to fall into an isolationist trap.
If we want peace and freedom on our continent, a sophisticated geopolitical European strategy is necessary. But that does not mean we have to be engaged everywhere to reconstruct the world according to our interests and ideas. That was the case in an unfortunate colonial past. We should do our homework inside the EU and in our neighborhoods in the aforementioned cases. Nevertheless, we must not forget that beyond our immediate neighborhood, the challenges coming from climate change and extreme poverty demand global-oriented policies. Such policies would also help to formulate and implement a migration policy that does not grossly violate our humanitarian principles.
*This blog is an extended version of my introductory remarks at the Peace and Security Talks 2024 organized by the IIP, Karl Renner Institut, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung - Regional Office in Vienna.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.