In March 2023, representatives from Serbia and Kosovo gathered in Ohrid, North Macedonia, for the second round of talks aimed at resolving the long-standing dispute between the two countries. Mediated by the EU, the talks were seen as a crucial opportunity to find a lasting solution to the ongoing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. The question is, did it succeed?
Historical Background
The current dispute between Serbia and Kosovo dates to the 1990s, when the former Serbian province of Kosovo – which has a majority ethnic Albanian population – sought independence from Serbia after its autonomy was revoked in 1989. Although initially mostly peaceful, the conflict erupted into violence in 1998. The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) fought against the Serbian police and army for the independence of the province. In 1999, NATO intervened in the conflict and bombed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, forcing Serbian troops to withdraw from Kosovo. The NATO bombing “helped” to solve the armed conflict, but the legitimacy of the bombing is still disputed within the international community. Since then, Kosovo has been recognized as an independent state by many countries, but not by all – in addition to Serbia, countries including Russia, China, and five EU member states (Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Greece, and Cyprus) do not recognize Kosovo. This has led to a complicated situation when seeking to resolve the conflict once and for all. However, since the beginning of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the EU has increasingly pushed for a solution to the conflict in order to prevent future armed conflicts and crises in Europe.
The Ohrid Talks
The Ohrid talks were the latest in a series of efforts by the international community to resolve the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo. The talks focused on a number of key issues, including the status of Kosovo, the rights of ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo, and the economic relationship between the two countries. The “Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia” was discussed and drafted at the first round of talks in Brussels in February 2023, while the Implementation Annex was drafted during the Ohrid talks.
One of the main challenges facing the negotiators was the issue of Kosovo's status. Serbia has long insisted that Kosovo is an integral part of its territory and has refused to recognize its independence. Kosovo, on the other hand, has insisted on its right to self-determination and has refused to accept any solution that does not involve full recognition of its independence.
Another major issue at the talks was the rights of ethnic Serbs living in Kosovo. Serbia has expressed concern about the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo and has insisted on measures to protect their rights. Kosovo, for its part, has insisted that Serbs in Kosovo should have the same rights as all other citizens but has also expressed concern about the presence of Serbian security forces in ethnic Serb enclaves in Kosovo. The talks also addressed the issue of missing people and potential means of redress.
Optimism & Pessimism
Despite the aforementioned challenges, there was some basis for optimism about the talks. Both Serbia and Kosovo signaled their willingness to engage in constructive dialogue, and there were some indications that a compromise solution may be possible. Both sides agreed to focus on a solution to the conflict and on their respective EU integration paths. The need for dialogue and talks between the two parties is exceptionally high – miscommunication and nationalist narratives have repeatedly derailed solutions to the conflict since the 1990s. Now, with the EU even more engaged and eager to help, one can expect some positive developments.
Nevertheless, no document was signed, and thus the result of the Ohrid talks is uncertain. Both parties have doubts about several points in the agreement – Kosovo still has internal political conflicts regarding the creation of the Community of Serb Municipalities. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was not ready to sign any document that would force Serbia to allow Kosovo to join international organizations – or at least this is what he told Serbian citizens in a press conference a day after the talks. Furthermore, Vucic said that he would never sign any document that equates to the recognition of Kosovo. Vucic still plays his hand very carefully when it comes to the Kosovo issue, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian and Chinese support for Serbia in the UN Security Council still represents a critical basis for the status quo, which seems to be the ideal “solution” for Vucic and his government. The question is, how much will status quo politics contribute to the overall prosperity of Serbia in the future? Is Serbia a European country seeking EU membership and promoting EU values, or is it a semi-authoritarian state on the European continent that is increasingly sliding into nationalist and autocratic narratives?
Serbia’s Geopolitical Dilemma
In order to solve the Kosovo issue, Serbia must first solve its own geopolitical dilemma, which has dogged it since the beginning of the 1990s – the dilemma is identified as the never-ending wandering between east and west. It seems that Serbia’s ruling politicians were unable to identify the right momentum to resolve this dilemma – when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, President Slobodan Milosevic still counted on the return of the communist regime in Russia and its ongoing support. This was the first miscalculation of Serbia’s foreign policy. The second was more of an internal political miscalculation that had long-lasting effects on Serbia’s foreign policy – when Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s first democratically-elected prime minister, was brutally assassinated after only two years in office in March 2003. This event completely changed and reshaped Serbia’s EU path – bringing to a standstill the fight against corruption and organized crime, reforms, and the transition to a democratic system. In 2012, the ruling Serbian Progressive Party came into power. From that moment on, Serbia has embarked on a “re-transition” to an autocratic system. The third and – for now – last miscalculation of Serbia’s foreign policy is the country’s approach toward Russia and its aggressive war in Ukraine. Serbia still has not implemented sanctions against Russia and has not demonstrated any intention to do so. Serbia is one of the only countries in Europe that has refused to impose sanctions, but, on the other hand, still gives the impression of aspiring toward EU membership – arguing that when it comes to armed conflicts, Serbia is neutral. Not only does this discredit Serbia as a trustful partner for the EU, but it also isolates Serbia from the “West,” which it wants to be a part of – at least according to statements by the ruling elite. Somehow, over the last 30 years, Serbia has missed every opportunity to be on the right side of history and thus gain the much-needed financial and political support to develop into a more democratic and prosperous state.
The role of the EU
The EU has played a key role in the most recent talks between Serbia and Kosovo and has provided a framework for negotiations. The EU has made it clear that it supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia but also recognizes the right of Kosovo to self-determination. The EU has also emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity. Nevertheless, the EU has failed to pressure both sides to implement all points of the Brussels Agreement signed in 2013. How can one expect the EU to secure the latest agreement if it was unable to secure the implementation of the previous agreements? In effect, the question is whether the EU needs to take on the role of a parent to Serbia and Kosovo. Both countries are more than mature enough to solve their respective issues together with the help they already receive from the EU. The willingness of Serbian and Kosovar politicians should thus be questioned because it seems that, for both sides, an ongoing crisis is a means to stay in power – especially in the case of Serbia.
The only option left for the EU is to motivate the citizens of Serbia and Kosovo to pressure their politicians to solve this conflict. To do so, the EU could offer a concrete timeline for the EU membership of both countries if they implement the agreements and successfully close all chapters of the EU accession process. This way, it is up to the politicians themselves to implement all the necessary requirements in order to secure a better and more prosperous future for their citizens. If they fail to do so, they will not be reelected. The EU would therefore be able to safeguard democracy and public support for EU membership in the two countries – which has been drastically reduced in Serbia. While it may not be a simple process, this would be a good starting point to rethink the current EU policies toward the region.
Overall, the Ohrid talks represent an important opportunity to resolve the long-standing dispute between Serbia and Kosovo. While the continued negotiations will undoubtedly be challenging, there is hope that a compromise solution can be found that will bring stability and prosperity to the region. Nevertheless, it is up to Serbia and Kosovo to decide if they are ready for “normalization” or if they would rather continue with the status quo.
Luka Čekić is a Project Assistant at the International Institute for Peace. He graduated from the German School of Athens and received his BA in Political Science from the University of Vienna. He is currently in his last year of studies in Political Science (MA) at the University of Vienna. His areas of interest include International Politics and Relations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control and Western Balkans.