I am currently in Belgrade at the invitation of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. It is as hot here as in Vienna and many other parts of Europe, and the liveliness of the city is comparable to many EU cities. Nevertheless, the meeting of the European Council a few days prior failed to bring this or any other city or country of the Western Balkans any closer to EU membership. In all discussions I have had here in Belgrade, I can sense a deep disappointment over the decision -- or rather non-decision -- of the recent Council meeting.
A confirmed stalemate
The stalemate in the accession process is certainly not the sole fault of the EU or its member countries. The countries of the Western Balkans have for many years neglected or passed over the necessary steps to advance towards membership -- despite their officially-declared aspirations. But the EU and several of its member states have again and again blocked progress in the enlargement process and “forgotten” to fulfill their promises. For years, they have spoken about the danger that “other” global players -- in this case, primarily Russia or China -- would use this delay to interfere with the region’s development .
With the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it has become even clearer that Russia is not only speaking but taking action -- actions to aggressively promote its geopolitical aims. Another chance to promote EU interests and defend them against Russian and/or Chinese influences has thus been missed. It is surprising that the EU has not used this opportunity to counter the Russian propaganda and influence that it so often critiques.
Cynics would say that a country needs Russian aggression and military intervention to get closer to the EU and be welcomed unconditionally. Considering how quickly Ukraine and Moldova received the status of candidate countries, this conclusion is understandable. But cynicism leads nowhere. As disappointing as the lack of engagement for the Western Balkan countries is, a path forward must still be found.
First and foremost, the acceptance of Ukraine as a candidate country was, in light of Russia’s aggression, unavoidable. Of course, one could criticize that leaders who categorically rejected Ukraine’s past EU aspirations have now accepted it without hesitation, but that is simply politics. Nobody can foresee how things will develop in Ukraine over the years to come. Will oligarchic structures really disappear? Will the authoritarian tendencies of President Zelensky be put aside after the war, or rather strengthened? Let us not forget that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will not disappear, even with an end to the war.
A new power balance
At the current moment, it is possible to detect a shift in the EU’s power balance towards the north. Countries in this region, including Poland, the Baltic states, Sweden, Finland, and others, have a different perspective and priorities. Strengthening the EU’s northern flank against direct Russian intervention is their prime goal, and given that several forces in Russia are questioning Lithuania’s very independence, one can understand the importance given to this defense.
Additionally, countries that are traditionally supporters of Western Balkan integration into the EU -- especially Germany -- are concentrating their efforts on supporting the EU’s northern flank. Nevertheless, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Austria are still supportive of the Western Balkan countries, but elsewhere in the region, Bulgaria is playing its own nationalist game and Hungary is supporting the development of authoritarian regimes and media outlets.
Moreover, the European Commission has been distracted by the war in Ukraine, and with a weak Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement - to say the least - it is not a strong player in finding solutions in and for the Western Balkans. It is clear that today the Commission is not the prime mover in the region: there is no special effort or creativity dedicated by the Commission in order to find new pathways to overcome various blockages or develop a concrete vision for an enlarged EU.
Examining new ideas
French President Emmanuel Macron, European Council President Charles Michel, and former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta have all proposed similar ideas about how a new and wider EU family could be constructed. It is not always clear if the authors of these proposals envisage this as an alternative or an intermediate step to prepare for EU enlargement. Independent from the motivation of the authors, the question has been raised whether, once founded, this would be de facto regarded as a substitute for accession. On the other hand, considering the past record of non-progress concerning enlargement, any new construction that would link candidate countries to member countries in an institutional manner could be seen as a step forward. Thus, instead of outright rejection of these ideas, a closer look and some concrete conditions should be formulated by the potential beneficiaries of these proposals.
One idea that could be very helpful to find a way forward is a detailed proposal drafted by the Centre for European Studies (CEPS) in Brussels and the European Policy Centre (CEP) in Belgrade. It could be linked to ideas for a European Political Community or European Confederation. This proposal for a staged integration process would give all candidate countries the chance to advance along different steps towards membership, depending on their progress in implementing necessary reforms. Additionally, a non-paper distributed by the Austrian Foreign Ministry has proposed enlargement procedures in a similar direction.
In relation to previous accession procedures, this proposal is discriminatory insofar as it creates bigger hurdles for accession than were stipulated in the past. Even in the first years of full membership, the veto power of new members would be limited in order to prevent blockades, as we see again and again today. But we need a path forward, even if this includes some limitations. This step-by-step integration process would also give ample time to member countries, the Commission, and the European Parliament to work on necessary treaty reform in order to raise the efficiency of an enlarged EU and reduce the veto power of all member countries.
At the same time, the enlargement process could also be promoted by a strong and united block of candidate (and potential candidate) countries. But if we look to the Western Balkan countries alone, there is hardly a common front. The Kosovo issue and internal divisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina reveal the lack of united efforts in achieving EU accession. There are some efforts for joint actions in the region, but they are either too weak or too limited in geographic scope.
The fight against corruption and for democratization
With all justified criticism of the EU and its lack of -- and even decreasing -- enthusiasm for integrating the Western Balkans, there is also a decided lack of enthusiasm in the region to fight corruption and guarantee media freedom. This is not equally true for all countries, but in some countries it is an endemic problem. It must be targeted both by the countries themselves and the EU.
The recent working paper “United for Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law - Vienna Declaration on Dealing with Authoritarianism,“ published on this website, addresses this issue. All these questions should be part of a common planned and organized staged integration process. This process would have the advantage of forcing a confrontation over these critical issues.
To answer the question posed in this article’s title, I believe that some progress has indeed been made at the recent European Council meeting. This primarily concerns Ukraine and Moldova and, in a limited sense, Georgia. For the Western Balkans, however, there were once encouraging words but no concrete decisions. Further, the formula proposed by the French presidency to overcome the Bulgarian veto against accession talks with North Macedonia could be seen as an encouragement for other countries to use their bilateral issues for future vetoes -- for example by Croatia against Serbia. This “bilateralisation” of the EU accession process by individual member states is very dangerous, especially if it can even prevent the opening of accession talks, and it puts national interests, narrowly defined, above the common European cause. That is an significant step backwards.
In any case, all activists and experts from the region participating in the event in Belgrade showed a deep disappointment in the European Council. Needless to say, neither a lengthy waiting time -- well- or poorly-used -- nor an attack by Russia should be an argument for proceeding quickly with the accession process. All candidates should have the fair chance to be treated according to its own merits.
We need a transparent and comprehensive accession process for all countries. Bilateral disputes should be solved through the help of EU institutions and based on EU values and principles, and the EU should dedicate more attention and more money to encourage necessary reforms and modernization. As shown by a recent study on financial support by the Vienna Institute for Economic Studies (WIIW), the countries of the Western Balkans face discrimination in relation to former accession countries.
Finally, there is some language in the Council’s conclusion that asks the Commission to elaborate new procedures for accession. It is now up to the Commission to move forwards and present convincing ideas for how to speed up the enlargement process according to proposals developed in recent years. There are sufficient ideas and proposals; now it is about implementation.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.