Once again, the peace in Europe is under serious menace. The conflict between Ukraine and its supporters in the West on the one hand, and Russia and its proxies in the eastern Ukraine on the other, risks degenerating into a devastating war. In the worst case it might potentially trigger even a nuclear exchange with Russia. Even short of such an apocalyptic scenario, a war in Europe would lead to a massive global crisis and thwart any serious multilateral action needed to tackle the truly existential threats of climate change and pandemics.
At the root of the current crisis is the refusal of the Russian Federation to accept the fundamental principle of the post-Cold War European security order: that each state has a sovereign right to choose its foreign policy orientation, free of pressure and intimidation. It is, therefore, a right of Ukraine to join NATO or any other international organization its people would freely choose.
While the attempts by the Russian Federation to impose a de facto veto on the enlargement of NATO are certainly regrettable, avoiding a hot war with Russia is a task of the highest order of importance. Preventing a war that would be ruinous for Europe, Russia, and, above all, Ukraine, therefore, takes precedence over any other priority and principle.
The logic of deterrence of the Russian aggression, while necessary, is by no means sufficient. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has made it abundantly clear that neither weapons’ transfers to Ukraine by NATO members nor a threat of devastating economic sanctions would alter his basic calculus – that these risks are worth taking given the perceived core Russian security and great power interests, i.e. preventing the NATO expansion to Ukraine.
Furthermore, experience shows that massive pressure does not lead the states to change their fundamental foreign policy choices. Iran, having endured Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign after the U.S. withdrawal from the historical nuclear accord, is a case in point.
Russia is a much more powerful state than Iran. It is therefore expected to absorb whatever economic shocks would derive from the new sanctions. And the potentially arising popular unrest as a reaction to falling living standards would, in all likelihood, be met decisively by Putin’s repressive machine. Moreover, if recent history is any guide, more sanctions could very well fuel the “siege mentality” in Russia and even strengthen the Putin’s regime.
Therefore, the highest interests of the European security require us to urgently explore the diplomatic options in defusing the crisis with Russia. Germany’s new social-democratic chancellor Olaf Scholz and the French president Emmanuel Macron both called, encouragingly, for a new European dialogue with Russia. This is the only way to arrest the catastrophic slide towards war.
That dialogue should start with an immediate renewal of the talks within the “Normandy format”, i.e. between France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine on the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement on ensuring the autonomy of the Donbas region within Ukraine. Minsk II remains the only viable, internationally legitimate and realistic way for the dispute between Russia and Ukraine to be solved peacefully. Any attempts to change the Minsk II agreements by force should be entirely rejected.
The gravity of the situation, however, makes the restart of the talks insufficient and unrealistic absent a major message from the EU that it is prepared to take Russia’s concerns seriously. Issuing such a bold message would not be tantamount to EU’s “appeasement” of Russia, but a necessary confidence measure that would pave the way for meaningful talks.
One such message would be a clear communication that Ukraine is not going to join NATO in the foreseeable future. Both France and Germany are members of NATO, as well as the EU. It is in their power to issue such a statement. That wouldn’t be a concession to Russia as it would merely state the obvious: that Ukraine is not on a trajectory to join NATO.
Nor would it be tantamount to “selling out” Ukraine as a sovereign nation. Examples of Sweden, Finland and Austria show that it is possible to be a stable, prosperous democracy without joining NATO. In fact, a full implementation of the association agreement with the EU already provides Ukraine with a roadmap to align itself closer with the EU norms and standards. Reforms along these lines would in themselves strengthen Ukraine’s long-term resilience and ability to withstand external pressures.
The EU should also offer a clear path for sanctions levied against the Russian Federation for the destabilization of the eastern Ukraine to be lifted as part of the implementation of the Minsk II agreement by all sides. Russia, in exchange, should commit itself to withdrawing its troops from Ukraine’s borders and cajoling its proxies in eastern Ukraine to abide fully by Minsk-II. If successful, such an agreement should serve as a basis for further talks between EU and Russia on principles of mutual peaceful co-existence, including addressing the issue of electoral interference, cybersecurity, and frozen conflicts, among others.
Such signals would help inject substance into the French and German intentions to reestablish dialogue with Russia. If Russia refuses to negotiate in good faith and chooses to invade Ukraine instead, new and crippling EU economic sanctions would be introduced. It is, however, in Europe’s collective security interest to avoid such a development and try diplomacy first.
The leaders of Germany and France should immediately embark on a broad diplomatic effort based on the outlined approach. That entails building a consensus within the EU, including by bringing Poland and Baltic states into the fold. It will be not easy to convince countries which had a bad experience with the Soviet Union/Russia in the past, that diplomatic efforts must come first. But the EU has anyway to design a comprehensive and long term security architecture for Europe as a whole. Such a system must include the US but must also involve Russia. As long as Russia feels excluded from such a system it will be a threat to stability and security in Europe. Such a comprehensive security system cannot be developed over night.
And one must not be naive about the readiness of today’s Russian leadership for a constructive dialogue. But a geopolitical European Union must also act in bringing security to the citizens of the EU itself and of it neighbors as supreme priority. And discussions should begin now.
Dialogue with Russia is not a reward for its destabilizing policies. It is a vital tool to defuse
current tensions and prevent them from boiling over to a hot war. It is >me for the current
generation of political leaders in Europe, particularly France and Germany, to raise up to the
occasion and show courage and vision for peace.
Eldar Mamedov, Foreign Policy Adviser S&D group EU Parliament (in his personal capacity)
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.