The Arab revolt, or revolution, started not in Cairo but in Tunisia in December 2010. It started when a young Tunisian – Mohamed Bouazizi – set himself on fire because of continuing harassment by the police. (See my blog in German from December). It required some weeks for the revolutionary spirit to arrive in Egypt, the most populous Arab country. For a long time the dissatisfaction with the different regimes in Egypt had been growing in the population. Egypt never experienced a democratic system. After different colonial powers – sometimes governing in parallel – and a corrupt monarchy the military ousted the old regime and founded a new, dictatorial system. For years it managed to govern with repression by shifting the blame for all misfortunes on external enemies, the West and especially Israel. Nevertheless, opposition and dissatisfaction especially among the young were growing.
Opposition from different sides
On the one side there were different Islamist groups, especially the Muslim Brothers. On the other side, there were secular, mostly liberal parties, which had never had a chance to get influence on politics. When I first visited Cairo in a political function in December 2006, I had a chance to meet both groups and saw their desperation. The regime of President Hosni Mubarak controlled the whole political spectrum and it decided if and how strongly these two groups could participate in elections and have presence in the “Parliament”. At the time of my visit, the Muslim Brothers were just semi-legal. The EU Commission delegation in Cairo arranged a meeting with their leadership. They presented a new program with more respect for the role of women in Egypt’s society, maintaining, however, that the position of the country’s president should be reserved for men only. In their eyes, the head of state had to be also a religious leader and that must be a man.
Overall, the Muslim Brothers tried to present themselves as a moderate group, but in the end, religion and faith played the dominant role. Already during this visit, I had the impression that they were stronger than the traditional liberal parties, which did not have young and dynamic members and followers. They lacked the religious fire and vison, that the Islamists got strength from. The liberal parties also had no vision or program which could attract young urban population. They were understandably frustrated and had no clue how to change the country. Both groups were as surprised as the regime when the revolt started and changed the course of developments, at least for some months.
January, 25th: The revolution starts on Tahrir square.
The dissatisfaction of the Egyptians exploded in the situation of this fragile equilibrium between the regime, the Muslim Brothers and the liberals. It happened on January 25th at Tahrir square in the center of Cairo. Ahdaf Soueif wrote in her book Cairo: “In one of the most moving moments of the revolution – and there were to be many – the people’s delegations had come in from the cities and provinces of Egypt, set up their banners around the garden and set up the chant “El-shar3eyya m’nel-Tahrir”- legitimacy from Tahrir”. Indeed, it was moving to see all those (mostly young) people who expressed their hope for drastic change and a new democratic Egypt. Many thought there was no way back to the old repressive regime.
But irrespective of many delegations from all over Egypt, the revolutionaries demonstrating in Cairo did not represent the majority of Egyptians. The famous Egyptian novelist Alaa Al Aswany – whom I had the honor to present the “Bruno Kreisky Award for the Political Book” for his wonderful novel The Yacoubian Building – wrote in his more recent book - The Dictatorship Syndrome: “On 25 January 2011, Egyptians rose up to try to bring down the dictator Mubarak. It is estimated that the revolutionaries made up only about 20 per cent of the population – 20 million out of 90 million Egyptians.” According to Alaa Al Aswany, it is the “good citizens” who are not interested in a revolution. The good citizens have been “educated” over the years by official propaganda to mistrust change and free political discussions, as they allegedly would lead to chaos. “The good citizen neither understands nor wants revolution. They keep a wary eye on it and are the first to believe counter-revolutionary propaganda accusing revolutionaries of treachery and of working for foreign interests.” These “good citizens” primarily live in the country side. As President Nasser once said: “Egypt is the Egypt of the villages”. Here the dictators – from Nasser to Mubarak – but also the Muslim Brothers had their stronghold. Both are rather conservative and not revolutionary.
Rise and fall of the Muslim Brothers
The first presidential elections showed weakened support for the old regime, but the candidate of the Muslim Brothers, Muhammed Morsi became president. As Ahdaf Soueif wrote: “Morsi wooed various secular parties and coalitions and made them sweet promises about how he would be the president of whole Egypt, not just of the Brotherhood.” Morsi had no convincing strategy to reform the country and find an alliance with the revolutionary groups. He had no economic and social strategy either. As Ahdaf Soueif defined his policies: “We find that the economic ideology of the Muslim Brothers is not very different from that of the Mubarak regime; essentially it is a free market, capitalist ideology that favors the corporation over the citizen and the rich over the poor. Where it differs is possibly, in its attitude to the poor; where the Mubarak regime discounted the poor, the Brotherhood sees them as objects of charity – and useful foot soldiers.” That is the tragedy of the Muslim Brotherhood (as well as other Islamist movements): their religious fixation prevents the development of a forward-looking economic and social program and of a convincing concept for a democratic renewal.
Thus, it was relatively easy for the military forces to overthrow President Morsi. It was clearly a coup d’etat, but it was one which managed to gather a broad support – ranging from the Salafists to most of the revolutionary groups from the Tahrir place. When I visited Cairo again in December 2013, only the representative of the “Movement of April 6” was critical about the forced deposition of Morsi, not because of him but because they foresaw that the new repression would not only affect the Muslim Brothers, but also all democratic groups and parties. General Al-Sisi was already a strong man and he became the new dictator. Until today many young revolutionaries or protesters are persecuted, many put into jail, or forced to flee the country. Members of the “Movement of April 6” suffered extraordinarily, as they continued their resistance. In addition to the widespread repression, the regime did nothing to reduce social hardships and the poverty rate is increasing, while no viable economic or social policy is in place.
International support for a dictator, but revolutionary memory remains intact.
After it became clear that the new regime is not only fighting the Muslim Brothers but any democratic movement, the West, including President Barack Obama, distanced itself from the new Egyptian president. But Moscow did not hesitate to strengthen its ties with Al-Sisi. Step by step the West renewed its links to the Egyptian president too. It is especially deplorable that the Italian government is neglecting the death of one of its citizens, Giulio Regeni, who was tortured to death by the Egyptian security forces, while President Emmanuel Macron is honoring President Al-Sisi with a very distinguished order and selling him French weapons. The Egyptian dictator is on best terms with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Together they fear the Muslim Brothers, similar to secular revolutionaries. They also support General Haftar in Libya who is trying to overthrow the country’s internationally recognized government. This international support, together with the domestic repression, certainly reduces the chance for a new uprising. But events in Algeria, Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon have shown that dissatisfaction in many Arab countries is huge. There are enough economic and social reasons to oust the present dictatorial regimes. In 2011 there were about 8 million people in the Middle East and North Africa living below the poverty line. By 2018, that number had swelled to 28 million and it certainly continues to grow. Nearly half of the young people aged between 18 and 24 have the intention to leave their country, according to opinion polls.
These economic and social conditions do not lead automatically to revolutions. However, opinion polls show that many young people view the Arab revolution in a positive light. It failed last time, but it could rise again. Let us not forget: the Arab revolt was one of the street and not a coup d’etat by a small (military) elite. These people are still longing to live in decent political, economic, social and environmental conditions. But no regime and no government of the region seems to be interested in promoting such conditions. Europe tries to help, but the original ideas of a “Marshall plan” disappeared. At the same time, there is no request for it from the regional governments either. Even the establishment of a comprehensive students exchange program is not on the agenda. I still remember a discussion I had with students at the University of Alexandria in 20006. Their most urgent wish was to at least study for some time in Europe. But most of the regimes do not want to enhance these exchange programs, as life in European societies would give these students new ideas about changing their repressive and failing regimes at home. And that should be prevented at all costs.
Picture: Mona
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.