What is the relation between history, the teaching of history, reconciliation, and peace? Even if people and politicians would agree on historic facts, the evaluation of these facts and the roots and causes leading to these facts vary extensively. In a Europe that was for centuries characterized by wars, the interpretation of history is particularly sensitive. The different, often antagonistic evaluation of past wars lead to new wars. The experiment to build a common Europe, beyond national, ethnic, and cultural cleavages, would necessarily only come about with difficulties. And the same was and is true for a region like the Western Balkans.
It was in 2009 when my colleague Jan Marinus Wiersma and myself edited the book Politics of the Past: The Use and Abuse of History. The background of our decision to deal with the relation between history and politics was centered in debates in the European Parliament, of which we were both members. As we were engaged with the enlargement of the EU after the breakdown of Communism and the Soviet Union, we wanted to bring a balanced approach into the debate between representatives of the ”old” and ”new” member states.
East - West debate
For some of our colleagues - especially from the founding members of the EU - the prime reason for a united Europe was overcoming nationalism and especially fascism and Nazism. They often neglected the evil done by Communist regimes. They could not see that the Red Army, after liberating countries under Nazi occupation, became in many countries an instrument for a new form of occupation by the Soviet Union.
Others neglected or minimized the evil done to Europe and its citizens by the different fascist regimes, especially Nazi Germany. And this neglect provoked many representatives from the West and South of Europe. Indeed, some of the opposition to EU enlargement towards the “East” was motivated by the determination to preserve the antifascist foundations of the EU. They feared that the attitudes and ideologies introduced by Eastern European countries into the European debate would dilute the clear antifascist basis of the EU. Many representatives of the new member countries, on the other hand, argued that Europe without the countries who suffered under Communism was incomplete. Europe must develop a clear and decisive anti-Communist attitude.
Past or Future
One could argue that Europe should think more about its future than about its past. However, all the different proponents for the necessity of dealing with the past - including on a political level – followed the words of the American writer William Faulkner in Requiem of a Nun: “The past is never dead. It is not even past.” And as the famous Oxford historian Norman Davies, who we interviewed as editors, said to us: “I think history is essential to thinking about the future.”
We dedicated our book to our colleague Bronislav Geremek, who tragically died during the preparation of the book in a car accident - much too early. Geremek was a Polish historian and a liberal politician. In his contribution that we published post-mortem, he wrote: “Ignoring history will make way for populists and demagogues to use it as a message of hatred and discord. The present is - whether we like it or not - rooted in Europe’s past. We cannot allow the memories of West and East to remain separate, turning their backs on each other. The only way of changing this is to introduce these separate and sometimes contradictory accounts into a shared, common education.” Any valuable European narrative must bring these different histories together.
Southeastern Europe
With the accession talks between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans, the European debate about history and politics took on yet another dimension. The efforts undertaken by French and German politicians and historians for a constructive dialogue on their “common” past were to be transferred and adapted to Southeastern Europe. The work done by the Joint History Project, organized by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe (CDRSEE) in Thessaloniki, was of prime importance.
The leading historian in that project, Christina Koulouri, made it clear that the work must deal not only with different views of different countries but must also address debates inside the countries of the region. The work of the history team sought to present the various approaches and attitudes of different nations, ethnic, and religious groups. As the aforementioned Norman Davies explained: “The best chances of getting near the truth, is to construct different perspectives before making a judgement”.
The foreign influence
The history of Southeastern Europe was not only made by the countries and politicians of the region itself. Many powerful “outsiders,“ including Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia - decided the fate of the Balkan people. They had a dominant influence on different regional and national political forces. And once again today we find different and often antagonistic influences. The EU offers - unfortunately with much hesitation - integration into a common Europe. But at the same time, Russia, Turkey, and even China want to leave their mark in the region. And at least Russia and Turkey come with their own historical interpretation.
In this connection, it is interesting that Turkey, which was part of the Ottoman Empire, an occupying force, uses its past role to extend its influence today. Similarly, the Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan argued and explained his recently-concluded alliance with Libya through the past colonial relationship. Turkey has also a vastly different interpretation of the recent events in Cyprus - in contradiction to the Greek interpretation. The victims of these different interpretations and broader power politics are predominantly the citizens of the Northern/Turkish part of Cyprus. They are under the occupation of Turkish troops who prevent annexation by the Greek side, according to the Turkish interpretation.
Russia, on the other hand, highlights its Orthodox religious connection to Serbia and in part to Greece, which resulted in some strange position or positions toward the Prespa agreement between Greece and North Macedonia. Russia fought against the agreement, which sought to resolve the name dispute - with totally contradictory arguments in North Macedonia and Greece.
A special case of contradictory views on the recent past concerns the events in Kosovo and the widely - but not universally - promoted independence of Kosovo (or Kosovo and Metohija). For many Serbs, Kosovo is the homeland and origin of today’s Serbia. For the Albanian majority, belonging to Serbia was a result of political machinations of Great Power politics, which added Kosovo to Serbia and indirectly to Yugoslavia for their own strategic purposes. Moreover, Serbia lost any moral claim to Kosovo by its oppressive behavior; Serbia was a colonial power. And the declaration of independence of Kosovo was a justified act of decolonization. For Serb nationalists on the other hand, the heart of Serbia has been taken away from Serbia by force - by Albanian terrorists supported by Western powers and NATO bombing.
Although the majority of EU countries recognize Kosovo as an independent country, those member states who have unsolved issues with a minority inside their borders did not. For them, the past is definitely not the past; they fear that their own border issues could once again arise. And in the case of Catalonia, it was indeed raised quite significantly in the recent past. On the other hand, concerning the United Kingdom and specifically Scotland and Northern Ireland, these challenges were no reason not to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Thus, it is always a question of interpretation if and how strongly the past might unravel again that leads to reactions today.
The colonial question
The independence of Kosovo could be interpreted as an act of decolonization - although there are some specific characteristics. Regardless, relations between former colonial powers and their former colonies are always difficult. That can be seen in relations between European and many African states. The love-hate relation between France and Algeria is a particular example. The Franco-Algerian historian Benjamin Stora argues that a joint culture of remembrance is very difficult: “After all, on the one hand we have French nationalism, which to this day does not want to accept the withdrawal from Algeria. Algerian nationalism, on the other hand, legitimizes itself on the basis of the victory over its former colonial master. This means for the moment, at a time when those who were involved in the wars are still alive, it is highly unlikely that they will reach agreement. Both sides feel they are right. We will have to wait another few generations to arrive at a common view of things. Naturally, all of this has to be countered in a progressive, educational manner.”
The question of decolonization in its multiple dimensions is of course not only something for politicians and historians. Art today plays an important role. Kara Walker - who previously designed a safety curtain for the Vienna State Opera with critical reference to the “Austrian African Imaginary” - asked: “What Do We Want History to Do to US.” And the writer Zadie Smith takes up this question and enumerates many possibilities of what history can do to us or teach us, from creating and promoting new antagonisms to underlining the connectivities between oppressor and oppressed. It is always a choice what “history should do to us” and what we do and do not want to learn from history. There is no automatic learning process from history.
Zadie Smith shows also in her contribution how many monuments praise explorers and exploiters in countries where victims of their actions must live amidst these “heroes” in stone. And there is no unique or self-evident way how to cope with the way past generations have dealt with the past - through history books or by erecting monuments for former leaders. It would help to strengthen the basis for peace and reconciliation if new knowledge about and new evaluations of past events and political actors became visible and present in both history books and in public spaces.
The nationalist counterreaction
We must also be aware that any kind of apologies by nations for their deeds in the past will stir and promote nationalistic forces at home. These forces misuse any balanced and self-critical attitude to their own histories, identifying themselves even with the most horrific past in order to combat political correctness. For them, recognizing facts and crimes of the past and apologizing for horrible acts is an offense to their national pride.
And as politics very much depends on emotions, this emotional, revanchist attitude of nationalist extremists will gain support beyond those voters who agree with the extreme content. The support for nationalist forces is widely connected with emotions due to feelings of exclusion, fear, and anxiety.
As Martha C. Nussbaum demonstrates in her book The Monarchy of Fear, we live in a time of increased fear fostered by globalization with its increased competition, including by migrant workers, and climate change, with its risk to our environment and welfare. What we would need - for example presented by historians - are “correct facts, informed public debate, and, most important, a spirit of dissent and independence on the part of the citizens. Fear, however, always threatens the spirit of dissent. Fear makes people run for cover, seeking comfort in the embrace of a leader or a homogeneous group. Questioning feels naked and solitary.”
And this is today’s challenge for politics and history science alike. Many citizens want clear - mostly nationalist - answers by strong leaders and no dissent among politicians and even less among historians. The ambivalence concerning history and its events is for many citizens difficult to accept. And they are supported in their resistance by nationalist politicians and media. But especially in times of such nationalist trends of simplifying history and rejecting responsibility and guilt, we need an approach of differentiation and the presentation of alternative and even contradicting views (but not “alternative facts“) to the same events. Moral judgements - as important as they are - should come after, as Norman Davies underlined, not before.
Morality and facts
Certainly, there are limits for both sides, for a balanced and understanding attitude towards certain historic events. There are crimes such as the Holocaust where, irrespective of nationalist backlashes, only a clear and unequivocal condemnation is morally acceptable. Historians and politicians should also make it clear which moral guidelines they use to evaluate facts and different approaches to certain events. For an open debate, it is interesting to know if the relevant personalities support democratic institutions and decision-making or rather authoritarian and “illiberal” attitudes. The ideology and moral compass of politicians as well as historians is interesting because they may influence the choice of documents that come to define and characterize historic events.
Let’s take the peace agreements after the First World War. Immediately after the agreements, the extreme nationalists in Germany reacted fiercely against the unfair treatment of Germany. Hitler and his regime undermined adherence to the treaty and violated the conditions set to prevent German rearmament. But there were also less ideological and more pragmatic criticisms of the conditions of the peace agreement, as it was not negotiated but unilaterally imposed. The economist John Maynard Keynes analyzed in his The Economic Consequence of the Peace the peace agreements and forecasted another war as a consequence of the conditions imposed on Germany.
In addition, several representatives of the newly-established small states were bitterly disappointed by the way how they were treated in Paris. “Agreements” that were dictated by the victors always have some flaws, even if they would be balanced in content. Regardless, one and the same event can be always criticized from different angles and perspectives. In the case of the Paris treaties, some feared negative consequences and wanted to prevent a new war, such as John Maynard Keynes. Others used reactionary arguments and wanted to justify new wars in revenge for the conditions set by the treaties. They wanted to undo and destroy the shame of having lost a war.
The Western Balkans
Inside the EU, we have undertaken many steps towards reconciliation and peace, even if we must acknowledge several steps backwards that have been taken by right-wing extremists and nationalists. In the Balkans, on the other hand, we are even farther away from reconciliation. The name issue between Greece and North Macedonia has been officially solved. But in both countries, there are many individuals, including state officials, who decline to use the official name of North Macedonia. And there is still no reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo, with starkly different interpretations about what happened in the past decades. In Bosnia and Herzegovina too there are forces that seek to dissolve their country instead of working towards integration.
As mentioned above, the CDRSEE asked historians from several Balkan countries to elaborate working books on history that should show the different approaches one might have to the same historical event. As the Centre had to close due to lack of finances, a “concluding“ event took place recently in Athens. The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung presented the Greek version of the history books/manuals elaborated in the framework of the Joint History Project. One only can hope that the end of the Centre is not the end of teaching history with the intention of contributing to reconciliation and peace in the Western Balkans.
France started an Initiative in the Council of Europe called History Observatory for Peace in Europe (HOPE). Let’s hope it will also be conducive for reconciliation in the Western Balkans. The endeavor of the IIP to promote the Western Balkans 2030 Project will continue to help to bring young people together to overcome past cleavages.
Outlook
In the framework of the discussion I could moderate in Athens, there was one question raised that was of general importance: is it wise if political institutions such as parliaments “decide” on historical facts? The starting point was a recent resolution of the EU Parliament that put Nazism and Communism on the same level. Both systems were unquestionably brutal and totalitarian. Nevertheless, as one of the panel members, Costa Carras, who was also the “father” of the Joint History Project, explained, there are differences. The Marxist roots of Communism did not automatically lead to a cruel dictatorship. Contrary to Marxism, Hitler’s ideological attitude already had in its genes the extermination of Jews and other enemies of the German race.
Regardless, there are three terrible historical events that continue to influence our present political conditions: Nazism and other forms of Fascism, Communist dictatorships, and colonialism. They all have different roots and forms of expression. But all were extremely inhumane and killed all those for whom they declined the right to live - out of racial or political consideration. Discrimination was practiced until extermination. The right to live was subject to the will of the leaders. In the end, all these ideologies and their political implementation have had and continue to have nationalism at their center. One’s own nation and race is superior to others. With Communism, there was a clear national hierarchy, where Moscow demanded clear leadership - maybe with some competition from China. The Communist ideology in Moscow’s interpretation was mixed with nationalism and colonialism.
To teach history today, one does not have to naively place all ideologies and dictatorships on the same level. But we must show how ideologies - and especially nationalism and the feeling of superiority - can bring about cruel and devastating political systems. To destroy others who are supposed to be inferior leads in the end to self-destruction. Nationalist forces will continue to fight against “political correctness,” which is to their mind undermining national interests. But history shows that, in the long run, all people will be the victims of nationalism and racism. Europe has the chance to learn from these self-destructive ideologies. It should not miss the chance.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.