On February 12th, in cooperation with the Research Center for Eurasian Studies (EURAS) of the University of Vienna, the IIP hosted a panel discussion ‘Russian Federation: Post-Putin after Putin?’. The welcoming remarks were delivered by Hannes Swoboda, President of the IIP and former MEP. The panelists included Irina Bolgova from Moscow State Institute for International Studies (MGIMO-University), Alexander Dubowy, scientific coordinator at the EURAS, and Greg Yudin from the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. Director of the IIP Stephanie Fenkart moderated the discussion.
In his welcoming remarks, Swoboda noted that while Russia has been relatively successful in its foreign policy in recent years, there are many challenges that it faces at home. Nevertheless, challenges on the international arena persist, especially the Ukraine issue. In the Middle East, it remains to be seen whether the Assad regime will prove to be a good ally for Russia, how the Iran-Russia competition will evolve, and how Russia’s dispute with Turkey over the future of Idlib province will play out. The EU is also in search of new types of relations with Russia, with leaders such as French President Emanuel Macron underscoring dialogue while also making clear that the EU has a strong voice.
Fenkart addressed the first question to Yudin, asking him about the possible reasons for the recent – and unexpected for many observers - resignation of the Russian government and appointment of the new Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, a former head of the Federal Tax Service, which was followed by the announcement of a constitutional reform in Russia.
In his opening statement, Yudin argued that among the political elites, there is also a lack of clear understanding about these events. Still, regardless of the meaning of the reform to come, it is clear that there will be a referendum, which has already been scheduled for April. This will be a crucial test for a political system such as that of Russia. Russia is a plebiscitary regime: a regime operated through a series of plebiscites. Elections can also be considered plebiscites in Russia, as their purpose is not to ensure political competition but rather to support the legitimacy of the incumbent. Plebiscites create a direct connection between the president – de facto the only politician in the country – and the people. As a result, the remaining state institutions, including all ministries, function as administrative bodies. The years after 2018 presidential elections (when, for the first time at least officially, the elected president got 50% of the vote) were disappointing for the Russian population. After the elections, the government did not change. An unpopular pension reform followed. The state has experienced a series of failures, such as during the elections for federal governors in 2018 and problematic elections for the Moscow city council in 2019. Russia’s state system has begun to lose momentum. Therefore, in order to reestablish its legitimacy, the regime has announced a new plebiscite. Another clear message from the announcement of the constitutional reform is that Vladimir Putin will not run for president after his current term ends in 2024.
Bolgova addressed the prospects of Russia’s foreign policy in the upcoming years, arguing that no drastic changes should be expected. First, in the new government of Prime Minister Mishustin, heads of the two ministries primarily responsible for foreign policy have not changed. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu kept their posts. Secondly, it is the president who initiates foreign policy in Russia. Therefore, as long as Putin is in power, Russia’s foreign policy will stay the same. In general, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept underlines continuity, which is embedded in Russia’s history. What is interesting about the current period in Russia’s foreign affairs is that its economic stagnation and modest share of global GDP as well as technological drawbacks should have damaged Russia’s global standing. However, the opposite is true. This is because Russia sees its foreign policy as an investment for the future. It supports formats such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Recently, the Russian President also proposed holding a P5 meeting to discuss global development and the threat of uncertainty. Russia’s foreign policy is trapped between the idea of preserving the old institutions of global governance and discussions around multipolarity and the emergence of new centers of power.
In the Middle East, Russia is considered an indispensable mediator by every party in the region. This situation is very advantageous for Russia, as interests and pragmatism are more important for Moscow than stable alliances or values. Regarding Eurasia, no significant change is yet possible in Ukraine, despite slight progress in December 2019. Inside Russia, there is no clear consensus what would be considered a success for Russia in this conflict, meaning that Moscow’s policy in this area will be very unstable. The Eurasian integration process is important for Russia only in terms of boosting its global clout. Currently, attention is focused on Russian-Belarusian bilateral relations, in which Russia pragmatically demands the loyalty of the Belarusian regime in exchange for its economic support.
In relations with the EU, Russia is promoting an idea of European collective security. Russia would be open to closer cooperation with the EU if it were less dependent on the United States. As long as this dependency persists, Moscow will be more interested in cooperation with China, as it is more likely to advance Russia’s global position, although the challenges of such cooperation are also clear.
Dubowy argued that the announced constitutional reform means that Russia is entering a new phase. The power system created by Putin in the 2000s is slowly but fundamentally changing. While there is no doubt that he will leave the presidential post after 2024, it is not yet clear which role he will chose for himself after that date. The search for an appropriate position is happening now. Announced changes to the constitution are rather cosmetic, and they confirm the established constitutional practice. The president’s powers will not be limited but instead will be substantially expanded. In addition, two controversial amendments have been proposed. According to the first, Russia reserves the right not to implement decisions made by international courts if they are considered to be in contradiction to the Russian constitution. The second controversial amendment is the plan to strengthen the State Council – an advisory body to the president established in 2000. According to Dubowy, the current dynamics of EU-Russia relations will continue in the upcoming years. Despite sanctions, mutual economic dependency will grow stronger. EU-Russia relations will be of a hybrid character: geo-economic cooperation will happen alongside strategic decoupling and confrontation. Russia will intensify bilateral relations with EU Member States, but not with the EU as a whole.
Questions from the audience and further discussion addressed issues such as Russia’s relations with Turkey and its role in the Middle East in general; the potential of Russia’s system of governance to become a model for other countries in the region and beyond; the discourse in Russia about Ukraine and attitudes towards Ukrainian President Zelensky; and economic benefits from Russia’s cooperation with China.
You can watch the full discussion below.