On January 26, a presidential election was held in Belarus. With the absence of any real alternative candidates to the current leader of the country, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, the election result was easy to predict from the start. According to the Central Electoral Commission, Lukashenka received over 86% of the vote with voter turnout reported at 85%. With no political space for non-regime candidates, massive repressions in the country over the past five years, and no media freedom, the election was neither free nor fair. Thus, it is a fair assumption that the results and turnout were falsified.
For some time, Lukashenka has not shied away from calling himself a dictator (here and here), and, as numerous examples of state propaganda and the activities of educational institutions suggest, a personality cult has been created around him. In this case, why hold an election at all? And what might the authorities in Belarus hope to achieve with this well-orchestrated ritual?
First, even authoritarian regimes require some sort of legitimacy, which they reconfirm by holding elections, even if the process itself is not fair and the vote count is manipulated. Elections are meant to demonstrate to both the domestic and international audience that the existing political regime and the leadership enjoy public support, along with the support of the country’s elites. In other words, they are meant to show that the leadership is in control of the country. The presidential election in Belarus in 2025 comes after a very turbulent one in 2020 that exposed a lack of public support for Lukashenka. While we will never find out the exact number of votes cast for presidential candidates in 2020, as the official results were rigged and the real ballot papers destroyed, certain calculations based on the exit-poll data conducted by independent civic initiatives suggest that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya – an independent candidate who turned out to become the main challenger to Aliaksandr Lukashenka – might have received around 54% of the vote. Lukashenka, according to these accounts, might have received about 34%.
The mass protests against election fraud and for a fair vote count that followed could be suppressed only by a brutal crackdown on the demonstrators and the political persecution of individuals, independent media, and civil society organizations in the subsequent years. Most Western governments did not recognize Lukashenka as a legitimate leader of Belarus and introduced targeted and sectoral sanctions against the country and the political regime there, further freezing relations with the official Minsk. These measures were further intensified due to Belarus’ assistance in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
With the new election, the official Minsk might be hoping to close the chapter of Lukashenka’s term in power during which his legitimacy was seriously questioned. This new term, which will be his 7th, is expected to help ‘turn the page’ in relations with the West, at least partially. To do this, foreign journalists, including from Western media, such as Reuters, Associated Press, BBC, and others, have been accredited to cover the elections in Belarus, apparently in the hope that their reports will demonstrate that the elections are happening peacefully and that there are no longer protests against Lukashenka’s rule. However, an observation mission from the OSCE was not present during the election period. The organization was invited to observe the election on January 17, i.e. ten days before the main election day – too short a notice for it to be able to prepare an observation mission.
The Belarusian authorities might also be hoping for new possibilities to at least partially restore dialogue with the West, given the fact that Lukashenka’s power is not challenged at home (even if the reason for that is fear of persecution) and broader geopolitical changes in the region. Ending the war in Ukraine stands much higher on the agenda of the West than ending the dictatorship in Belarus and, particularly with Donald Trump in the White House, the West might be less principled in its position on Belarus. Official Minsk may also hope for the lifting of some sanctions imposed on it due to the support of Russia in the war if a ceasefire agreement is reached.
Another ‘bargaining chip’ in Minsk’s hands is political prisoners whose release has been demanded by the West and some of whom have either citizenship or other strong connections to various EU countries or the United States. Minsk hopes that in exchange for their release, it could obtain the lifting or at least partial relaxation of some sanctions. The amnesty granted to almost 200 political prisoners in the past months, along with video clips on state-run television of some imprisoned journalists with a connection to the United States, might have been an attempt by the Belarusian authorities to signal to the West their readiness to open dialogue about those remaining behind bars. It should be noted though, that arrests on political grounds have continued in parallel with the releases. The human rights center Viasna reported that over 1,200 people were behind bars in Belarus on politically motivated charges as of the end of December 2024, while it is estimated that since 2020, about 136,000 people have become victims of political repression.
Is any thaw in Belarus-West relations really possible? As expected, much will depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the possible peace talks, and whether Belarus will be represented there and by whom. In principle, however, Belarus is far from being the priority on the agenda of the EU or the United States. Therefore, any sort of major reset in relations with Minsk seems unlikely, especially as it is increasingly perceived to be subordinated to Russia’s interests and lacking its own agency. Even in the Russia-West prisoner swap in August 2024, no Belarusian political prisoners – unlike Russia’s opposition politicians – were released. Also, while Lukashenka demanded a seat at the talks on the Ukraine-Russia war, he stated that if he were not granted it, ‘Putin will express Belarus’ position’.
The Belarusian opposition, which has been active in exile for the past five years and has enjoyed access to high-level decision-makers in the EU and the United States, has been split over their joint strategy. Some of its segments advocate for harsher sanctions on the regime in Belarus and against any resumption of dialogue, while others suggest focusing on the release of the political prisoners as the priority topic of oppositional activities abroad. This would also presuppose reopening communication channels with Minsk, even if behind closed doors.
In conclusion, while the presidential elections in Belarus are hardly a game changer in the domestic situation of the country or its relations with foreign partners, the status quo in Belarus might change in the coming years, primarily for reasons that are beyond the control of the current leadership in Minsk. Additionally, Lukashenka’s advanced age and deteriorating health might make him decide to pursue a transit of power – a process he has long discussed but has not implemented so far.