Ethiopia’s brutal civil war, which devastated the country for two years and claimed more than 600,000 civilian lives, came to an end on November 2, 2022 through an agreement on the “permanent cessation of hostilities” (CoH) signed in Pretoria, South Africa (complemented by the subsequent Nairobi Declarations on November 12, 2022). The agreement was achieved “after eight months of intense shuttle diplomacy,” the breakdown of the humanitarian truce in August 2022, and ten days of negotiations in Pretoria behind closed doors. The international community has warmly welcomed the agreement and the progress of the CoH´s implementation thus far. The UN Secretary-General hailed it as “a critical first step” to ending the war and bringing about a lasting peace in Ethiopia.
The major actors in the civil war include the Ethiopian Federal Government, the Tigray People´s Liberation Front (and its military wing, the Tigray Defence Force), the Eritrean Defence Forces, and the Amhara Regional Force and Fano Militia, with all of them - to varying degrees - having a vested interest in the outcome of the war and the peace process. Nonetheless, they are not yet part of the peace process.
While no two conflicts are the same and the context within which a given conflict arises and evolves matters, a systematic analysis of the causes, nature, and dynamics of various conflicts and their management is possible. Thus, one can draw lessons from conflicts in other regions of the world for the Ethiopian peace process - particularly from the intractable conflicts in the Western Balkan. Moreover, one can seek to learn from conflicts that have become frozen or even resolved.
Accordingly, in this article, we would like to reflect on what made the CoH possible, what the agreement on the CoH is (not) about, and what the potential roadblocks to its full implementation are. In so doing, the article will draw on lessons learned from peace-making initiatives in the Western Balkans.
How and Why Did the CoH Come into Effect?
Many factors may explain why and how the CoH agreement came to fruition. These include the ever-shifting dynamics of the war, ´war fatigue´ due to economic woes, growing public apathy to the war, and carefully-crafted diplomatic interventions. Given the nature of a war characterized by an extreme level of ethnic animosity, zero-sum thinking, the involvement of a foreign regime (Eritrea) hellbent on a war of vengeance against the TPLF, and unbridled informal militias – creative diplomatic tools were needed. Thus, without the conflict’s ripeness, no amount of diplomatic pressure would have produced any effect - at least within the short term. A ´mutually hurting stalemate´ seems to have paved the way for sustained shuttle diplomacy, which, in turn, streamlined trust-building initiatives.
The mediation process was undertaken under the auspices of the AU and further enhanced by actors such as the UN, IGAD, the US, South Africa, Kenya, the EU, and other friends of Ethiopia. Seemingly cognizant of the criticisms levelled against the AU´s lukewarm approach to managing the conflict and the need to further enhance diplomatic efforts, the AU formed an official mediation team - constituted of Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa (who led the shuttle diplomacy); Uhuru Kenyatta, the former president of Kenya; and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, South Africa’s former deputy president.
Throughout the mediation process, the mantra of “African solutions to African Problems” was invoked time and again. One may conclude that the AU has renewed its political agency, IGAD has once again realized that conflict resolution is one of its primary raisons d’être, and the insider-partial mediation approach, when coupled with diplomatic intervention, is invaluable in managing conflict in the African context. The pivotal role played by Obasanjo - the Special Envoy - cannot be overstated. In an article for SEMAFOR, Obasanjo wrote: “Refusing to be discouraged, I continued with visits, consultations, and discussions to get face to start talks between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the leadership of Tigray people.” It remains to be seen whether the AU will continue to serve as an important security actor. However, in brokering the CoH in Ethiopia, it played a considerable role.
In addition, the fact that the final stage of the CoH agreement was untaken under relative secrecy and behind closed doors - sealed off from the media – is reminiscent of the Oslo process. It was an ingenious and diplomatically creative decision to do so given the fact that the political atmosphere was extremely polarised, diaspora communities were under significant pressure, and spoilers were waiting at the gates. Thus, a diverse set of factors contributed to the success of the mediation process.
What the CoH Agreement is (Not) About
The peace agreement, in a nutshell, is a restoration of the political status quo ante. This entails, in practical terms, the restoration of the constitutional order so that both parties will exercise their respective powers according to the stipulations of the constitution; the mutual recognition of both parties as legitimate political actors; the resolution of contested territories through procedures set out in the constitution; the settlement of political difference through political dialogue; and the holding of regional elections in Tigray, owing to the nullity of the election held in September 2020 and, by extension, the facilitating of Tigray´s representation in the government structure.
For the full restoration of the status quo ante to take hold, various faciliatory matters are included in the agreement. These include: the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of Tigrayan forces; confidence-building measures, such as the provision of immediate humanitarian aid and the restoration of basic services; the cessation of hostile propaganda; the delisting of the TPLF as a terrorist organization; and a joint communication between the highest military commanders from both sides.
However, one should not get carried away by the silencing of the guns as if it will address any of the long-standing issues that have been dogging the Ethiopia’s socio-political fabric. Crucially, the peace agreement does not deal with all the issues and parties to the conflict - much less does it deal with the structural causes of the war. Moreover, the agreement is extremely lopsided when it comes to striking a balance between peace and justice in that it appears to be undergirded by the desire for “peace at any cost.” It is no wonder that there are no separate provisions dedicated to accountability mechanisms in the CoH, apart from a passing remark envisaged under Art. 10(3) of the agreement. It partly reads: “The Government of Ethiopia shall implement a comprehensive national transitional justice policy aimed at accountability, ascertaining the truth, redress for victims, reconciliation, and healing, consistent with the Constitution of FDRE and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework.” Consequently, all issues concerning accountability mechanisms are left to national mechanisms. To this end, the government recently released a Transitional Justice Policy that received little public attention - partly because it was not widely disseminated and perhaps because the government never genuinely wanted to solicit feedback from relevant stakeholders. Nevertheless, as recent experience shows, it is hard to envision accountability in the absence of strong institutions, fundamental political reforms, or, more importantly, effective public participation.
To be fair, it seems that most of the structural issues - social, political, and institutional - are to be dealt with in a separate process: the National Dialogue Commission, which was established one year ago. However, if the experience of the defunct Truth and Reconciliation Commission provides any guidance and the procedure through which the National Dialogue Commission came into being is at all similar, it is safe to say that there is a tradition of instrumentalizing transitional justice mechanisms by the incumbent government. Indeed, the establishment of the Commission has already been received with mixed feelings.
While some observers - mostly pro-government groups - are optimistic about the prospect of the Commission achieving its intended goals, others seriously question its legitimacy - to the extent of calling it “dead on arrival.” It may not be dead yet, but it is deeply flawed, and the government will likely use this to buy time and ultimately consolidate its power unless the process is reinvigorated. At the very least, it ought to be inclusive and owned by everyone. After all, it is a national dialogue, as indicated by the name - a dialogue among all concerned stakeholders, a staged performance.
A Flawed Peace Process is a Postponed Crisis
As Clayton and Sticher point out, whether a ceasefire is durable or not largely depends on the design of the agreement. Their findings suggest that “a ceasefire with a verification and monitoring mechanism appears to have been more effective than a less comprehensive ceasefire in containing deadly violence.” Provided that conditions are favorable, it follows that the CoH is promising precisely because it has a loose inbuilt verification, monitoring, and compliance mechanism, as provided under Art. 11 of the agreement and further bolstered by the Nairobi Declaration. The implementation of the DDR process - especially the disarmament of heavy weapons - has commenced, as the recent visit by a team of monitoring, verification, and compliance to Mekelle indicates. Furthermore, Advisor to the President of Tigray Regional State Getachew Reda announced on Twitter: “Tigray has handed over its heavy weapons as part of the implementation of the peace agreement.” However, the Achilles heel of the CoH lies, inter alia, in its exclusion of relevant stakeholders and/or spoilers; the foreclosure of space for the international community in serving as guarantors of the peace process; the complete disregard for public perception about the implementation process; inadequate accountability mechanisms; and the postponing of the issue of contested territories by using ´constructive ambiguity´ as a diplomatic tool of expediency.
According to the findings of Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, the success of the implementation of peace agreements - especially those brokered by international actors - depends on two factors: the difficulty of the implementation environment and the willingness of the international community to provide the necessary resources and commitment to a long-term peace-making project. Among the difficulties surrounding the implementation process, spoilers and hostile neighbours must also be seriously considered. In this regard, spoilers have never been in short supply in the Horn of Africa. More specifically, the Eritrean regime and Amhara forces are both stakeholders and spoilers given that they participated in the civil war directly and actively. Despite this, the peace agreement has excluded both parties. At a bare minimum, procedural fairness would have required extensive consultations on security guarantees and future political arrangements.
Although the peace process must be owned nationally and implemented within the regional framework, the loose monitoring, verification, and compliance mechanism put in place by the AU could and should have been further bolstered by clearly outlining the roles of relevant entities. Above all, the DDR process requires financial resources, technical expertise, and a coordinated approach. Significantly, Ethiopia lacks nearly all three and must therefore rely on international assistance. For this reason, the direct and formal involvement of the UN would help alleviate strains and ensure the steady implementation of the CoH.
Public perceptions regarding the peace process also matter, but they have not been given sufficient consideration in the Ethiopian context. The war was primarily over a political difference between two political parties (the ruling Prosperity Party and the TPLF). Meanwhile, ordinary citizens - those most affected by the war – have waited desperately for an end to the humanitarian blockade and the restoration of normalcy. As such, any public perception data - particularly on social media - should be taken with a pinch of salt.
That said, as per a recent opinion poll[1] conducted by the author on Facebook and Twitter concerning the efficacy of the peace process, the vast majority of participants (63.3%) dubbed the peace process “fundamentally flawed from the outset.” 29.1% voiced their concern that it “suffers from some irregularities, but remains hopeful,” and a minority (7.58%) indicated the process was “flawless and on the right path.”
Thus, substantial consultations with all relevant stakeholders and a bottom-up approach to the implementation of the peace process will prove critical to its success.
In the same vein, the adage that “there is no lasting peace without justice” is not just fanciful language. In this regard, a comprehensive empirical study conducted by Daniel Druckman and Lynn Wagner shows that the effective management of internal conflicts and ending cycles of violence requires broad-based justice. It is a widely accepted fact that to ensure accountability there must be a peaceful environment. But this does not mean that justice must be traded for peace. Rather, by using proper sequencing strategies, striking a delicate balance between the demand for an expedient peace and robust justice is possible.
The issue of contested territories between the Tigray and Amhara regional states – the elephant in the room – should not be taken lightly. Because this issue has existed long before the onset of the civil war and served as fuel during the fighting, it fundamentally affects the future relationship between the two peoples and will remain a source of intractable conflict unless and until it is resolved. Strategies such as special protections within the existing constitutional order or granting autonomous self-administration might be possible. But what will ultimately decide the fate of the contested territories and related issues therein will be the will of the people - not a temporary political dispensation. To this end, the next steps will entail sustained dialogue, trust-rebuilding measures, the reintegration of displaced people, reconciliation, and informed referenda.
On top the aforementioned issues, the situation in the Oromia region and beyond remains precarious. The civil war in Oromia - one of the conflicts that has the potential to destabilize Ethiopia - has been wilfully neglected. Milkessa Gemechu has dubbed the situation in Oromia as the hidden reign of terror in order to signify the magnitude of the problem and its potential repercussions. Jawar Mohammed, a prominent political figure, remarked: “As long as the war continues in Oromia, Benishangul Gumuz, and other regions, the Tigray agreement will either fall apart or become just another war alliance.” Thus, a comprehensive peace plan is the only tenable way out of the multifaceted conflicts unfolding across Ethiopia.
The Western Balkans: An Example for Conflict Resolution?
One must carefully consider the specific circumstances of any conflict before drawing general conclusions. There are, of course, conflicts in which it is possible to neatly define the two sides and concentrate efforts to resolve the conflict by applying pressure to the two sides. However, this is rarely the case; conflicts are generally far more complicated and protracted. As in the case of Ethiopia, the wars of Yugoslav succession had numerous participants and interests – both internal and external.
The Complexity of Conflict Management in the Western Balkans
The wars of Yugoslav succession were started by parties that sought to break up Yugoslavia and deliberately opposed all efforts to reform and restructure the multi-ethnic, multi-faith state. Each party to the conflict also received varying degrees of support by external actors with an interest in the conflict. The EU had no unified opinion on the outcome of the conflict; some member states supported the dissolution of Yugoslavia, while others wanted to maintain the country’s unity in a reformed, more democratic federation. Russia clearly supported Serb interests, while Turkey and other Muslim countries in the Middle East supported the interests of Muslims/Bosniaks. The US had no clear favourite, but it was interested in serving as a peacemaker and was eager to prevent a change of the political orientation of the region in the direction of Moscow.
Similar to the foundations and origins of a conflict, the solutions to a conflict can also be rather complicated. However, for many observers and actors involved in the resolution of the wars of Yugoslav succession, it became clear that future conflicts will be increasingly similar to those in the Western Balkans. Javier Solana, the EU High Representative at the time, concluded: “the massive, complex, protracted, multi-national, multi-faceted and ultimately regionally owned peace effort in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a model for what crisis and conflict management is likely to look like in the twenty-first century.”
In the end, the West had a clear interest in stopping the wars and seeking an agreement to resolve the status of the newly independent states. Russia, meanwhile, had no clear vision for the future but generally sought to support Serb interests across the region. One incentive for the newly independent countries as well as Albania was the potential for EU accession - a “European perspective.” The countries thereafter became “potential candidates” for EU membership.
However, it must be added that the “peace agreements” were far from perfect. The Dayton Agreement set out a complicated constitutional arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of two entities: the majority Serb Republika Srpska and the majority Bosniak and Croat Federation. UN Security Council resolution 1244 left the status of Kosovo unresolved and did not deal with the question of independence. Once again, internal conflicts over the rights and obligations of the different entities and communities brought insecurity to the region – which continues to this very day. Russia in particular has sought to exacerbate these differences and conflicts by continuously supporting Serb interests. Meanwhile, local leaders utilize foreign support to spoil efforts for reconciliation and integration. At the same time, the influence of the West has grown weaker due to the decreasing attractiveness of EU membership. The EU has not sufficiently considered how to integrate the countries of the Western Balkans even before they fulfil the conditions for full membership, and the countries themselves are not implementing these conditions when they contradict their immediate political and economic interests.
The Role of the International Community in Peace-Making
The ongoing external influence of the EU and the US remains a major factor in preventing frozen conflicts in the Western Balkans from heating up. This influence is supported by economic aid and partly by the opening of markets for goods from the region. The liberalization of visa regimes and participation in some EU programs are additional elements underlining the EU’s protection and supervision of the region. Nevertheless, Russia, China, and Turkey constantly intervene to counter Western policies across the region. Needless to say, the West does not have complete control of domestic and foreign policy in the region. There is thus a permanent struggle to convince governments - with help from civil society inside the countries - to keep mutual understanding and peace alive.
It should be noted that, in any conflict where there is no clear winner and loser, there must be sufficient incentive to find a compromise and ensure its implementation. External incentives must be combined with pressure and sanctions when needed. In the case of the Western Balkans, this is “relatively” easy as these countries are not yet members of the EU but still hope to join someday - even with decreasing public support. When countries are members of the EU – or, in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the AU - pressure and sanctions are much more difficult to impose or implement. Nevertheless, the EU recognized that a union without sanctions possibilities is a weak union. Thus, the EU created mechanisms for how to impose sanctions on its members. One must admit that these possibilities for sanctions are still relatively weak. While the AU is not yet as cohesive of a unit as the EU, the implementation of ceasefires and peacekeeping affords strong possibilities from external or superior authorities.
One such authority is the UN. However, the authority of the UN has been weakened - by many vetoes in the Security Council and by violations by permanent members themselves. Therefore, regional organizations must increasingly take over responsibilities previously filled by the UN. As difficult as it may be, the AU must add relevant organizational capacities and its leaders must be courageous enough to speak out against leaders or groups who grossly violate its principles. This may affect any party to a conflict. A stronger and more self-confident AU would also be able to cooperate with the UN and the EU as outside partners in helping to solve conflicts and implement peace agreements. Clearly, in the case of the Western Balkans, one can observe the robust cooperation between leading Western actors and the UN.
In Search of a Just Peace
For a sustainable peace to hold, a just peace - not just any peace - is a precondition. The notion of a just peace is predicated on four pillars: thin recognition of others as autonomous beings; thick recognition of identities; compromises from all parties to the conflict; and rules of the game clearly stipulating the procedures for future engagement and defining the rights and duties of the respective parties.
The most important but simultaneously most complicated element in finding and implementing peace is seeking justice as a basis for reconciliation, as many questions cannot be answered easily. Who is responsible for war crimes? The political and/or military commanders? The acting troops and/or individual combatants? What was justified defence, and what was unnecessary aggression? What is important is not so much to seek justice as a result but instead justice as a process of finding perpetrators. And it is especially important for citizens who suffered as a result of these crimes.
As Carla Del Ponte, the Prosecutor at the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), remarked: “Politicians, historians, and those in a position to argue will likely endlessly discuss the nature of the conflict. For many, political and historical definitions will always be more important than the human dimensions, human suffering, and individual responsibility. By contrast, criminal prosecution targets exactly the human dimension of each criminal offense - the perpetrators and the victims.” But one must also accept that the judicial record does not always “outweigh alternative individual or group understandings or interpretations of the past.”
The ICTY as well as national courts played an important role in trying to seek justice, but they could not prevent interpretations that denied obvious facts. One extreme example is the genocide at Srebrenica. There will always be parties who refuse to accept well-documented facts, even after a court decision based on testimony and scientific proof.
As a result, any resolution after such complicated conflicts may be incomplete. With the careful attention and involvement of international actors, local and regional participants to the conflict can become active participants in conflict resolution. However, as mentioned before, protracted conflicts will need protracted conflict resolution plans. The question is therefore whether all actors will be patient enough to wait for results and work even with small successes in the meantime. It is not yet definitively clear how things will develop in the Western Balkans, but it remains important that the international community stays vigilant and ready to apply strong pressure on any party that threatens a return to violence. For the Western Balkans, this seems to be the case. Let us hope this will be also the case for Ethiopia.
Concluding Remarks
After enduring a decades-long cycle of violence, a pervasive culture of impunity, and the most horrific civil war in modern history, Ethiopia is currently at a crossroads. Regrettably, it has squandered all previous opportunities to come to terms with its past and chart a better future. Now is a time to decide the fate of the country: to end the pervasive culture of impunity, to part ways with the long tradition of violence, and to entrench a political system based on the rule of law.
Towards this end, there must be a comprehensive peace plan that is underpinned by justice, a lasting commitment, lessons learned from other regions, and effective cooperation from the international community. As Adam Roberts succinctly put it: “preventing future war is not simply a matter of establishing a system of order in which uses of force are effectively restricted: any system of order needs also to incorporate a strong element of justice.” In Ethiopia, this goes without saying.
A comprehensive peace plan must also reflect the complex situation on the ground – diverse issues, multiple parties, and a magnitude of crises – and focus specifically on ending the cycle of violence once and for all. Otherwise, a flawed peace plan will only become a postponed crisis.
Conflict management experience from other regions of the world, including the Western Balkans, shows that, first and foremost, solutions to protracted and complex conflicts call for local solutions that coordinate approaches and ensure long-term commitments from all actors, including the international community.
Finally, maximum pressure must be exerted by all concerned citizens and the international community to rein in the tendency of the regime to instrumentalize the peace process.
[1] Description of the diagram: the three colours represent the following, respectively. The green(63.3%)-the peace process is fundamentally flawed, the yellow (29.1%)-the peace process suffers from some irregularities but is promising, and (3) Pink(7.58%)-the peace process is flawless and on the right path.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IIP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.
Moges Teshome is a Ph.D. student at the Vienna School of International Studies and former Project Assistant at the International Institute for Peace. Mr. Teshome holds a Bachelor of Law from Addis Ababa University, LLM in International Criminal Justice and Human Rights from the University of Dundee and Master of Advanced International Studies from Vienna School of International Studies. Mr. Teshome’s research interests include conflict management and regional security, global human rights and advocacy, international criminal justice, the normative study of international relations, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology and sustainable development. Before joining the IIP, Mr. Teshome interned at Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-proliferation as well as served as a lecturer of law and associate dean at Haramaya University College of Law. At Haramaya University, he was responsible for teaching various legal courses, undertaking policy-oriented research and community services, notably coordination of free legal aid for the needy and marginalised section of the society.
email mogeszewdu2013@gmail.com