Written for the XXX Economic Forum in Karpacz, Poland.
Most international observers were surprised by the outbreak of war in fall 2020 about Nagorno -Karabakh after it has been called frozen for 27 years. Well, obviously one could not foresee an attack at exactly the time it was undertaken by Azerbaijan. However, it seems that a country – in this case Azerbaijan, is not willing to accept that part of its territory is occupied by its neighbor. For some time, this violation of Azeri territory could be used by President Ilham Aliyev to strengthen his grip over the Azeri population. But in the end, it could not be accepted by any Azeri leader. Such an occupation or even annexation could only happen when the occupier is much more powerful or has unconditional support by a powerful ally.
Armenia’s illusions
Perhaps this was the vital mistake of the Armenian authorities. They have been extremely shortsighted. They thought that Russia would in any case support them without hesitation and only them. But already the sale of weapons to Armenia as well as to Azerbaijan should have shown that Russia is taking a much more balanced position. As Armenia had no alternative than to count on Russian help, Russia was free to have also good - including military- relations with Azerbaijan. These friendly relations could also last during the first phase of the war which was particularly successful for Azerbaijan. Russia intervened just before Armenia would be totally humiliated and before Azerbaijan would occupy the whole region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has an interest to have strong political, economic and finally also military access in the whole region. It has now troops on the territory of all South Caucasus countries.
Turkey made a difference
As often is the case, also the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan did not solve the core issues. It certainly weakened Armenia and strengthened Azerbaijan although it also has now to accept Russian troops on its territory. The winner is certainly Russia who anyway had only to wait in order to strengthen its position. Already in the years before the war, during the freezing of the conflict, Russia was in a strong position. Armenia could not act without Russia and Azerbaijan was limited in its actions having Russia across the border recognizing also the military alliance of Russia with Armenia. The difference now made a strong vocal and material support by Turkey. It gave Baku a leverage and made also its position stronger vis-a-vis Russia - but as we saw only to a certain extent. At the end the agreement to stop the war was negotiated and signed by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - and not by Turkey. For Turkey and especially for President Erdogan to be supporting the winning side brought certainly benefits. At least it underlined the role Turkey wants to play in the region - from the South Caucasus to North Africa. In this region - including the Middle East - President Erdogan is looking for any chance to develop activities, which would strengthen Turkey’s role beyond its economic strength.
Russia and Turkey the main actors
These two countries, primarily Russia and in second position Turkey will be the vital players in the region. Of course, also Iran plays a regional role, but for the moment it has too many unsolved issues at home and too many engagements in the wider Middle East. It therefore cannot afford a strong engagement in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, the US and Israel will not allow a stronger role for Iran in the region. Another de facto player, Israel was supporting Azerbaijan with its military technology, but it will probably not be too engaged in the South Caucasus. Of course, any military presence north of Iran would help Israel in case of a military conflict with Iran. Overall, the situation in the South Caucasus stays fragile. It is doubtful if the two global/regional powers Russia and Turkey will have an interest in a quick solution of the core conflict. The biggest interest has the weakest country, Armenia. But the costs for a quick compromise solution would be very high – especially domestically. It would have to make offers to Turkey to win its support. But this would be against the year-long struggle of Armenians to force Turkey to recognize the genocide at the end of World War I. Azerbaijan as the clear winner of the war can live - at least for some time - with the present open situation.
The limited capacity of the EU
And the European Union? Well, the EU is far away and the links to the South Caucasus are weak. The strongest links are to Georgia, which was not involved in the war and stayed neutral. The EU has developed good relations with Armenia in the framework of the Eastern Partnership but not as strong as with other countries. Armenia is cautious not to offend Russia. And with Azerbaijan the relations are rather weak. Azerbaijan has enough energy resources and does not need European money and does not want European advice and support for democracy and human rights.
Unfortunately, there is no strong engagement in the region which could have been the basis for a greater role for the EU in finding a solution for the conflict. Maybe, if relations would be better with Russia and/or Turkey the EU could have a stronger say in the development of the region. But this is not the case. Especially Armenia would like to have the EU in a more friendly relationship with Russia at least. It would give them more space to maneuver between the two. In Europe one must recognize, that cutting links to Russia is helping internal cohesion but, on the other hand, it is reducing geopolitical capacity in its neighborhood to the East. Additionally, neither Russia nor Turkey are very keen on close - political- relations with the EU. Only if the economic situation in these countries would endanger the stability of its political systems and/or leadership, these countries would look for closer ties with the European Union and its transformative capacity.
A new mindset would be necessary
However, the European Union, or better the European unification process after World War II could offer some hints how to solve the issue. Certainly, one should not hope for a new Caucasian Federation or an Armenian - Azerbaijan Union. But a principle change in attitudes is necessary. Instead of structuring the world according ethnic and nationalistic principles the countries would have to accept ethnically and religious mixed entities with permeable and finally open borders and promoting cross- border cooperation. This created peace and stability in European regions like South Tyrol or Elsass - Lothringen. Such changes in national attitudes do not solve all problems and there always will be nationalists who will question and challenge peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups. Nevertheless, sound economic development and political cooperation could diminish the risk of new open conflicts.
For the moment Turkey is not promoting such attitudes as we can observe when looking at Erdogan’s persecution of Kurdish political parties and leaders. Nevertheless, efforts should be undertaken to ease the relations between Armenia and Turkey. The genocide issue should for the moment not prevent the opening of normal diplomatic relations. Such kind of normalization would not coercively result in immediate solutions and principal support for Armenia, but it could be helpful to reduce tensions. Russia on the other hand, as a clear multi-ethnic country would be more helpful. It follows a strong Russian nationalistic course, but it is not ethnically driven. Still, looking to the European Union could help in designing a peaceful future to the region. However, the work must be done by the Armenians and the Azeris themselves and therefore the political leadership is highly responsible for violent escalations. An open-minded look to the more ethnically diverse past, especially in Azerbaijan could be very helpful in this respect.
The wider picture
The conflict in the South Caucasus has underlined the fragile but for the moment successful cooperation between Russia and Turkey. It is a cooperative competition or a competitive cooperation: a very strange relationship which theoretically could anytime turn into a strong antagonism. But both countries have for the time being the main interest to provoke the Western alliances and come to terms with each other in the Caucasus as in Syria and even in Libya.
In the meantime, the global picture changed in their favor. The USA/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan has further weakened the Western position. Of course, the intervention in Afghanistan has been guaranteed to fail for several reasons. Still, it shows very clearly the limited success of military interventions with the aim of nation-building and/or the export of democratic values. Iraq and Syria are additional examples of the often-catastrophic outcomes of military-interventions which do not have a holistic and long-term approach which includes the people, takes into account their emotions, histories, family-ties or sociological backgrounds. Russia, Turkey and China have a policy of pragmatic adaptations and will try to win politically but also economically out of the new situation.
Those European countries which followed the US in their simple but disastrous military intervention policy will have to reflect on the failure of these strategies. The EU is built on a different foundation. But too often that foundation of peaceful cooperation internally and of the promotion of peaceful coexistence internationally has been forgotten and military interventions have been seen as effective and efficient. The EU should continue to be based on human rights but the strategy to promote these values and principles globally should be based more modestly and pragmatically. Otherwise in the end, the West/European Union will neither be able to promote human rights nor establish peace.
Creating Conditions of Peace
With all the regional actors and geopolitical interests, the domestic issues, issues of the past and results of violent outbreaks, it is necessary not to forget those who suffer the most– the people living in the region but also all the displaced and internally displaced, those who suffered personally or who lost family and friends. In 27 years, the issues of how to live peacefully have not been tackled inclusively. The status quo is not the best option, since it cements the presence of Russia in the security field and sets the focus on the present rather than on the future. Confidence building between Armenians and Azeris is as important as trying to understand the conditions of the present situation. Even though there are four UNSC resolution claiming that Armenia should give back the occupied territories, it is more important for Armenia and Azerbaijan to enter into a dialogue and in finding a compromise. What many political leaders fail to understand is that a compromise does not mean defeat, but it could be a way forward. To get a mandate from the population to tackle the core issues by coming to terms in an acceptable manner – for both, Armenia and Azerbaijan -would give them more political leverage and more independence from external actors.
Mag. Stephanie Fenkart MA is Director of the International Institute for Peace (IIP) since 2016. She has an MA in Development Studies from the University of Vienna and an MA in Human Rights from the Danube University, Krems. She is furthermore a member of the Advisory Committee for Strategy and Security Policy of the Scientific Commission at the Austrian Armed Forces (BMLV). She is also a board member of the NGO Committee for Peace, Vienna.
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.