Recently the IIP – with Maryia Hushcha excellently in charge – organized jointly with partners a conference on the question if and in what way the post-Soviet space exists. Of course, one can answer this question in different ways – depending on the perspective one chooses. One way would be to look at it from a pure time perspective or regard it from a geographical point of view. Then the answer must be yes, there is an area which can be defined as post-Soviet geographically and an era which is defined as post-Soviet historically. But from a political and especially geopolitical point of view you may look at it differently. Post-Soviet could be used in a derogatory term and deny the countries, which have been included in - or even occupied by - the Soviet Union, an independent position and policy. Therefore, I can fully understand the hesitancy of many politicians and social scientists of these countries to accept that term.
Post-Soviet Russia today
Some experts, including a few who participated at our meeting in Vienna, strongly rejected the expression post-Soviet. They argued that if one does not speak about a post-Habsburg space or post-Austro-Hungarian space, why should we speak about a post-Soviet space? I would counter that there is a difference. Neither Austria nor Hungary continued to exert decisive influence on the successor states to the monarchy. It is different with Russia. Russia, especially President Putin, does play an important role in many of the successor states. Often Russia has allies or at least sympathizers in these countries. Part of the citizens express nostalgia about the “good old times” in the Soviet Union and some are openly supporting Putin’s interference into their states. Importantly, Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union - especially under President Putin – is still thinking it has the right to directly influence foreign but also domestic policies of several successor countries. Russia perceives itself as post-Soviet as it still dreams about the lost empire and wants the states in their neighborhood to “respect” Russian interests.
If one regards the conflicts which have been created and/or supported by Russia in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, it is obvious that in the eyes and mindsets of the Russian leadership there exists a post-Soviet space. There are even some interferences in the Baltic countries but their membership in the EU and NATO protect them from an outright intervention. In some strange sense EU accession helped those countries which could join the EU, but worsened the conditions of those who could not join. A similar pattern applies to NATO membership.
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, especially the recent war between these two countries, has shown a different type of engagement by Russia. Moscow helped to reach an agreement, which did not solve the conflict but stopped the war. Of course, the Russian interest has been met by stationing Russian peacekeepers. At least here we see a more sophisticated intervention, an intervention which helped to stop a bloody conflict, instead of triggering one. In Central Asia too, one finds a strong Russian influence, but here it faces competition with China.
Without saying it directly, Russia regards its “near abroad” as its legitimate sphere of influence. With this argument it justifies its interventions in it. Russia asks the rest of the world to recognize this, based on some sort of Russian Monroe doctrine. Concerning Ukraine, President Putin used an even more explicit language, limiting the sovereignty of this country. Of course, one could argue that Russia’s or specifically President Putin’s opinions are subjective interpretations of geopolitical facts. But as Russia is an important and strong power, this subjective view has objective results. All the conflicts in and with successor states of the Soviet Union and their persistence are demonstrating a new reality.
One cannot assume that Russian President Putin wants to solve these conflicts and is actively working to reach a compromise. On the contrary. Certainly, the Putin factor is decisive. As Vladislav Inozemtsev wrote recently in the NZZ, Putin is not an “Asian tyrant”, he acts like a European deal maker, but one of the early nineteenth century. He acts like Count Alexander of Novgorod and it is not surprising that Putin recently attended the erection of a monument to Count Alexander. As the Soviet Union included elements of Russian authoritarianism, today’s post-Soviet Russia includes old Russian but also Soviet characteristics. Not only does this determine the domestic situation in Russia, but also its relations with its neighboring region.
It seems, as Kadri Liik from the European Council for Foreign Relations wrote recently, that President Putin is reacting to a very chaotic world, which the West is less and less in control of. “The new world is so chaotic that Moscow appears to consider almost any long-term planning futile.” This interpretation of Putin’s “strategy” contradicts the frequent accusation that Putin wants to restore the old empire.
The social dimension
There is another dimension we can call post-Soviet. That is the social or societal dimension which is characterized by limited democracy (Orban would call it illiberal democracy), widespread corruption and a lack of an open and frank discussion of the past. Official Russia, and here again with President Putin in the lead, is exemplary in denying many of the past crimes and the roots of this “misbehavior”. Those NGOs that are trying to enhance transparency about the past Soviet crimes and are trying to fight against the intentional forgetting and for a culture of memory are persecuted and prevented from contining their work. The most prominent organization, which promoted an open discussion of the crimes during the Soviet times, but is also actively defending human rights today is Memorial.
The European Parliament has always supported the work of Memorial and I myself had many discussions with its representatives who showed their determination to deal seriously with the past. Therefore, I supported very much the decision in 2009 to award the Sakharov Prize of the European Parliament to Memorial. But Russian authorities know perfectly well that dealing openly with the dictatorial past will result in questioning the current authoritarian regime. That is the reason why they want to finally put an end to their work.
At least in the areas where there is a direct Russian influence like in Eastern Ukraine, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, one can find a similar attitude towards democracy and honest dealing with one’s own past. Of course, one must add Belarus with Lukashenka. There are differences between these countries and breakaway regions, but the main political line in these areas is the same.
Thus, the post-Soviet space is a fluid phenomenon. In a wider interpretation it would comprise all the countries of the former Soviet Union, where Russia has a strong direct or indirect influence by setting limits to the sovereignty and autonomy of these countries. In a more narrow interpretation, it would only include areas with strong political and partly military influence of Russia. In these areas Russia is not only trying to influence the foreign policy of the affected countries, but also to connect with local oligarchs and corrupt structures.
Russia alone?
Is Russia alone in having such a semi-imperial policy in trying to control its sphere of influence? Certainly not. I mentioned already the Monroe doctrine. It suffices to look at the strange and counterproductive Cuba policy by different US administrations. But the US – with its long history of CIA involvement, including killings, and military interventions – did not hesitate to change regimes even far away from their neighborhood. China today is actively extending its zone of influence by occupying or even creating new islands for military outposts. Putin’s policy and behavior has its special characteristics and is a direct challenge for the European Union. But Russia is certainly not alone in “defending” its zone of influence. In all above-mentioned cases, such policy is not compatible with international law. It is a policy that gives the bigger and stronger more influence and power.
Independently from this important legal position, the question remains, if the West – USA and EU – should not have reacted with more sophistication and sensibility to the breakup of the Soviet Union. It would not have been easy to convince countries and people who suffered in their union with Russia, to accept a comprehensive Transatlantic and European security system which would include Russia. But it would have been worth trying. Europe and many countries in the neighborhood of Russia would be better off today. The most important task of the West and Russia today is to reach a correct reading of its other intentions. As Kadri Liik concluded in her contribution for the New York Times: “If both sides can look at each other with sober eyes, some limited cooperation and effective messaging would be possible. The alternative doesn’t bear thinking about.”
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.