Certainly, the outcome of the US presidential elections will have some important consequences for the EU. For many observers and political actors, good transatlantic relations are vital for the European security and peace. They regard good relations between the two sides of the Atlantic as traditional and even „natural“. But is it really true that good transatlantic relations are natural and obvious, while any other kind of relations is, historically speaking, an exception?
Pacific versus Atlantic
Looking at it historically, the Pacific plays for the US the more important political and security role in comparison to the Atlantic. Only after World War I - for a while - and then after World War II, the Atlantic relations came to the top of the US agenda. The common enemy, the Soviet Union, narrowed the gap between the two halves of the West. After the breakdown of the Soviet empire, the Pacific region became again the number one area. The pivot to Asia was more “natural” than strong Atlantic relations. As Janan Ganesh wrote recently in the Financial Times: “Europe was never the sole or even main geopolitical draw on a nation, that has had a Pacific coast for 200 years.” Thus, geopolitical Europe must acknowledge that the US is no longer the automatic patron of the EU, because for the US “Europe is no longer the strategic crux of the world”( Janan Ganesh). The fact that many of us grew up in times of the Atlantic solidarity in the West and that, irrespective of our military alliance or neutrality, we all interpreted these ties as a security guarantee, does not give an assurance that this “Atlantic Community” will continue to exist in ist present form.
If we agree with that analysis - and I do - then Donald Trump’s neglect and even contempt for Europe is certainly an extreme form of reorientation towards Asia, but no radically new approach. In addition, the rise of China and its growing aggressiveness in the South China Sea is seen as a real danger for the American dominance in the Pacific area. The U.S. never realized a trauma like Pearl Harbour in the Atlantic region. Since Russia is no longer seen as the main enemy, China has become (and was made) a new main threat. That may be different with Jo Biden as President, as he was always engaged in strengthening the Atlantic Community. He is a traditional multilateralist and expressed this attitude clearly during the election campaign. Nevertheless, the China agenda will take much of his time and energy. In addition, fundamental historical trends will not change: they are leaning towards Asia. But at least Biden expressed his opinion, that a joint Western strategy would be his aim: “When we join together with fellow democracies, our strength more than doubles. China can’t afford to ignore more than half the global economy.”
Fundamental difference
Some see the gap between the US and Europe as even deeper and irreconcilable, beyond the alternative orientation towards Asia. For Bruno Maçães in his recent book History has just began, there is a fundamental difference in the approach to politics between the two “Atlantic” sides: “While Europeans concluded, that society had to be rebuild on better foundations, Americans despaired of the task - which seemed to them to sink the individual into deeper forms of social control - and opted to look to ways in which one might simply escape from reality rather than embark on the risky venture to change it.”
All the US inventions - from Hollywood, Disneyland, TV series like Dallas and Denver to the development and widespread use of social media - are expressions of the tendency to invent a new “reality” outside and beyond the complex and complicated situation of the real world. And that became also true in US politics. Trump is the most extreme and “efficient“ expression of someone who lives in a second “reality”, which he often even creates himself - according to his needs and interests. Following what already Donald Rumsfeld declared, for Trump too alliances are not a stable element of a long term strategy. He uses them when and if needed for his immediate purposes. Or, as Bruno Maçães says in his book: “Trump wants victories over rivals and allies alike.”
Making deals instead of changing course
Surely, one can see and feel a certain kind of Americanization in China, Japan, South Korea and even Europe. Nevertheless, Europe is too “social-democratic” in its approach. It has a reform and transformation agenda. The US, especially with Trump as President, wants to do business and strike deals. Of course, this attitude and approach brings some results. One example are the new relations between Israel and some Arab countries. Neither Israel, nor the Arab countries are asked to change their attitudes and policies. The Arab countries have only to buy American fighters and weapons, what they would like to do anyway, while Israel must accept that their Arab neighbors get modern weapons and military equipment. Israel is especially not asked to change its occupation policy! It seems now that there are some talks even between Israel and Lebanon - which are still officially in war with each other - concerning their maritime border. Probably Europe is too much focused on a fundamental change, human rights and the fate of Palestinians and Kurds. It therefore overlooks some of the immediate possibilities to promote change.
If Trump will be re-elected, then we should not expect a change in his attitude to politics - he may even enhance his style and enforce his aggressive stance on China. Europe will stay out of his main focus, unless he would choose another state secretary. However, overall he seems to be very happy with Mike Pompeo. Anyway, Trump and Pompeo will try to divide the EU and to find individual partners for specific issues. Some countries would probably be ready to conclude separate agreements with Trump. Especially those, who feel they are being pressured by the EU to adhere to European values and principles. Even concerning security - against Russia - some could be inclined to come to agreements with the U.S., especially if NATO would be weakened by the very same U.S. President.
This would certainly change if Biden wins the elections, but he may be too anti-Russian with some countries. Biden would stick to NATO and multilateral efforts. Due to the strong attention given to China, Europe will have to enhance its own defence efforts. But with Jo Biden as President, Europe could be a valuable ally not only for a joint and coordinated policy towards Russia but also in relation to China. That depends on the EU’s readiness to work on a common line. Without Merkel, as one of the recognized authorities and “spokespersons” of the EU, it will be much more difficult. President Macron could take over from Chancellor Merkel, but he would have to act much less as a French representative, but to think and act much more as a European. Strong skepticism about heavy military interventions should be a joint U.S. and European line.
Shying away from military interventions
The policy of skepticism towards direct military engagement started already with President Obama. This policy, and Obama himself, was heavily criticized over the case of Syria. However, nobody really presented an alternative to the US restraint. Against many expectations and forecasts, President Trump did not translate his aggressive attitude and way of speaking into military intervention. Neither in Korea, nor in Iran, or anywhere else. Probably, in the near future, no President after him can restore that kind of ”liberal” aggressiveness. This is a positive development. The alternative of using and threatening to use economic pressure is not really satisfying. Nevertheless, it is better than killing and creating new hate amidst the occupied people.
Also, inside the US there are enough researches, authors and lecturers who try to design new strategies. These would constitute an alternative to military interventions driven by “liberal” values on one side, and to the value-free and erratic “deal” policy of President Trump on the other side. Such approaches include the policy of sticking to liberal values at home and promoting them generally without forcing other countries to adhere to the same principles and to go the same “liberal” way. One has to recognize and accept that other countries develop different, mostly authoritarian, forms of governance. As Rebecca Lissner and Mina Ropp-Hooper express it in a Foreign Affairs article presenting the main content of their book The Open World : What America Can Achieve After Trump: “Neither a nostalgic quest for the old liberal order nor an isolationist retrenchment will serve U.S. interests”.
The U.S. must accept that it can no longer have global dominance. As Stephan Wertheim convincingly argued in his book Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy: “Global dominance would come at a terrific price: perpetual warfare and the transformation of America into something like an empire.” The U.S. would have to give up the aspiration to dominate the world. As mentioned before, the concept would be to prevent dominance by others without insisting on one’s own dominance. Would that be possible even with President Biden?
New realism
The US must accept competition by these authoritarian powers, but “the U.S. and its partners must keep authoritarians from dominating beyond their borders, thereby ensuring that the world remains accessible and independent.” Of course, with the U.S., independence is often understood as dependency on the U.S., but at least it should not be a militarily enforced dependency. R. Lissner and M. Ropp-Hooper underline the new attitude: “Like Obama and Trump, Biden would enter office promising an end to the endless wars of the post 9/11 era.” So in some way, Trump - in spite of his outmost dislike of Obama - followed his line of military restraint, deplored by neo-cons and old-style security experts like John Bolton. Biden, with all his criticism of Trump, would probably also follow this line of refraining from military interventions, whenever possible. As Dan Hamilton said in our discussion: “Biden today is also a Jeffersonian, after having been for many years a Wilsonian.”
Bruno Maçães also pleads for a new realism. A global superpower should accept “the coexistence of many different ways of life, while stopping all of them from becoming dominant or endangering the balance”. He formulates it as a simple slogan: “The goal ist to make the world safe for America without making it look like America.” Thus, the world is still seen from an American perspective, but at least Americanization is not enforced, at least not with military means.
The chance of climate policy alliance
For Europe, with its comprehensive interest in a peaceful and sustainable world, refraining from enforcing narrow-minded interests, especially military action, is not enough. One of the explicit aims of the European Union is an active climate policy. That is something which is not at all on the mind of President Trump. He is a climate change denier. Joe Biden, on the contrary, is much more “European”, or “Californian”, in this respect. He would be a strong partner in issues related to environment and climate change.
Together, the U.S. and Europe could also put pressure on China to implement progressive climate policy. For the moment, there is a strong contradiction between heavy Chinese investment in coal within the country itself and worldwide, and the declarations of Xi Jinping that China becomes climate neutral in 2060. For the world as a whole, a coordinated strategy of these three economic powers would be a big step forward. It would give multilateralism an enormous boost.
Disarmament and the nuclear issue
Where multilateralism is in real danger is the whole field of disarmament. The violation and/or abrogation of agreements especially by the U.S. and Russia is of great concern for Europeans. The EU as basically non-military power is quite hesitant to mingle into the debates about disarmament and possible new agreements. And the military on both sides have always an interest in experimenting with new weapons and defence systems. Joe Biden may be interested to find a way to convince Russia to be ready for new agreements, but the question how to involve China will not be easy to solve. It is of course typical for Trump’s unilateralism and neglect of disarmament issues that he declined the offer of President Putin to prolong for one year the New Start agreement. Therefore, if Trump is reelected, one cannot hope for new disarmament initiatives.
Another serious concern for the Europeans is military development in the Middle East. Here Trump has a very simple-minded strategy: Israel should be strengthened and Iran weakened. This strategy has been more and more supported by Arab governments. The common enemy Iran is bringing them together. In addition, every country in the region should buy American missiles, airplanes and defence systems. The Trump administration is quite negligent about Saudi’s preparation and readiness to acquire nuclear capabilities. Overall, Europe is concerned about nuclear proliferation in general, whereas the Trump administration has concentrated its efforts solely on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
In this respect, the Europeans are still thinking about a nuclear free Middle East. With Israel as the sole - unofficial - nuclear power in the region, it will be difficult to come close to such an agreement. Nevertheless, Europe is interested in a comprehensive solution and not only in a new balance of power towards Israel and America’s Arab allies. With President Biden a new effort to save the nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA) could be undertaken. But Europeans must join the U.S. in demanding from Iran a policy of reduced interference into the affairs of its neighbors, like Iraq and Lebanon. In addition, the whole question of missile development and deployment should also be to be put on the negotiations table.
Challenges in chaotic times
The stability of the postwar period is over. The hope for a new area of liberal democracies to dominate the world has not come true. The world today is much more complex and the future is much more difficult to predict. People look for clear and easy answers. At least in Europe the populists have - for the moment - lost influence, as recent opinion polls and elections showed. But in the U.S, it seems, Trump will still be voted for by a big number of followers, even if Jo Biden eventually wins the elections. This is why Edward Luce gave a recent comment in the Financial Times titled Trumpism is likely to live on, whoever wins the White House. He concludes the article by saying: “The fixes to America’s problems are manifold, complex and painstaking. A vaccine will not suddenly banish the pandemic. Nor would Mr. Trump’s defeat magically bring an end to Trumpism.”
The necessity of Jo Biden to heal many wounds at home is an additional argument why President Biden would not be as much concerned with Europe as he, or the Europeans, would wish for. This is an additional argument, that Europeans must be prepared to act for themselves, to solve the main issues they are confronted with - from Russian assertiveness, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman foreign policy to the migration issue. But they could at least be sure that Washington would not spoil European efforts and could be an ally on some global issues, such as climate policies and the fight against poverty and hunger. Together U.S. and the EU could mitigate some of the global threats and reduce the global chaos.
Picture: The Kremlin
Dr. Hannes Swoboda, President of the International Institute for Peace (IP), started his career in urban politics in Vienna and was elected member of the European Parliament in 1996. He was Vice President of the Social Democrat Group until 2012 und then President until 2014. He was particularly engaged in foreign, enlargement, and neighborhood policies. Swoboda is also President of the Vienna Institute for International Economics, the Centre of Architecture, the University for Applied Science - Campus Vienna, and the Sir Peter Ustinov Institute.
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