War in the Caucasus - Karabagh conflict: Why war?

Introduction.

The violation of the ceasefire on 27th September was unprecedented in terms of its scale, weapons used, casualties and intensity. This time it was also distinguished by a more active position of Turkey, who through political backing of Azerbaijan seemed to be challenging Russia’s domination in the security of the region. It lasted for two weeks, resulting in the return under Azerbaijan’s control of a part of two occupied regions and agreement of the humanitarian ceasefire with mediation of Russia’s president Putin. However, the ceasefire was almost immediately violated and the civilian targets of the second largest city Ganja were shelled from the Armenian territory causing significant destruction of apartment buildings and casualties among the population.

There were high hopes in the early 1990s that in spite of the wars, states and societies of the South Caucasus will get liberated from the Soviet legacies and will be integrated in the West.

The famous 1994 Harvard paper “Back in the USSR” by Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett reflected post-Soviet Russia’s ambitions realized through the support for secessionist conflicts, and made it clearer why liberation from Russia was a primary goal for at least Azerbaijan and Georgia. The authors saw it as the only way for both stability and democratization in the region.

Wars and conflicts did not help this objective. They caused humanitarian crisis, slowed down both reforms and the integration process. Karabagh was the most complex conflict, as, unlike other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, it had two states involved in military support for the secessionist movement – Armenia and Russia. The conflict was accompanied by violence and masses of displaced people, both from Armenia and Azerbaijan. All this was aggravated by the unresolved issues of the past. Moreover, against the background of evolving war, the democratically elected president of Azerbaijan Elchibey was the first in the Former Soviet Union to get rid of all Soviet/ Russian bases and resisted  Russia’s interests, which he saw as violating the country’s re-stored sovereignty. These included Russia’s peacekeeping forces, border troops and Russia’s military bases.

On the contrary, driven by revived historical narratives of conflict Armenia retained all the former Soviet bases, signed an agreement on defense and security with Russia and not surprisingly, with active participation of the Soviet/ Russian bases by the time of the ceasefire in 1994, had established military control over 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory, including Nagorno-Karabagh. Military actions in the early 1990s were used, as a former Azerbaijan government representative confirms, by Russian official representatives as a means of pressure on independent Azerbaijan, which was even threatened by Armenia’s capture of second largest city Ganja.  The ceasefire has been supported without peacekeeping forces for almost 27 years with increasing large-scale violations during last few years.

Fragile peace.

Since then years of negotiations took place, with mediation of the OSCE Minsk group co-chairmen, which included the US, France and Russia. For Russia, it was an opportunity to have another – internationally legitimate – way of influencing the conflict, besides engaging in it behind the scenes. At the same time, stability was maintained thanks to the Western actors´ vested interest in Azerbaijan’s resources. The strategy of the then President Heydar Aliyev was to use energy resources of the Caspian to balance Russia’s domination in the region. But all the attempts to achieve full independence from Russia and resolve the major security concern – the Karabagh conflict – had only a partial success. An alternative organization GUAM, uniting states with similar foreign policy orientations and security concerns (namely Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), did not receive enough attention to form serious counterbalance to Russia’s continued utilization of conflicts as a means of weakening resurgent states.

Nor the West was willing to press enough for resolution, as the existing status quo provided sufficient level of stability for the satisfaction of its energy interests.  The countries were close to the agreement in the late 90s, but it resulted in dramatic violence in Armenia’s parliament and resignation of a number of officials from Aliyev’s government. The economic leverage which Azerbaijan was trying to use as an incentive for conflict resolution did not work. Besides, both states tried to use the ceasefire to strengthen their armies, equip them with the most modern weapons, buying  or receiving them from Russia, Israel and others. Armenia was building infrastructure on the occupied territories to connect it to Nagorno-Karabagh, settling there population and gradually integrating it into Armenia. Azerbaijan utilized its rich resources to build an army, realized national and transnational economic projects and invested in the region and beyond it.

However, the Azerbaijani government had to deal with the pressure of almost 1 million of IDPs and refugees and the occupied territories. The presence of a few hundreds of thousands of IDPs – the result of scorched earth technique in the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabagh – in particular was a permanent reminder of the unsolved problem.

However, the possible solution within the Minsk process did not seem realistic. First, it brought “normative uncertainty”, equalizing principles of territorial integrity and right of self- determination. While one international body – the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – adopted four resolutions demanding unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces, further actions to implement those demands did not follow. The Minsk process, on the contrary, “legitimized” application of force by turning military gains into a bargaining tool. In the negotiations process the withdrawal of forces is tied to the determination of the status of Karabagh. This message could be read by the parties to the conflict in the following way: the international law can be evaded with the use of force, and the greater one’s military gains are, the more they will receive as a result of a deal.

The format of the Minsk group negotiations was not promising either. All three countries representing the institute of co-chairmanship were not perceived as impartial actors. Russia has been a direct ally of Armenia, and thus rather a party to the conflict, while France and the US have strong political influence of the Armenian diaspora. The US Congress in the early years of conflict adopted sanctions against the Azerbaijani government, later lifted, while Macron just a few days ago surprised Azerbaijan by openly pro-Armenian statements. Armenia in turn was unhappy with the absence of Nagorno-Karabagh as a party to the negotiations.

Normative deficiency is expressed through the absence of any consequences for the perpetrators of military crimes, or for the deportation of civilians, or for violating of rights of minorities. On the other hand, due to the conflict’s peripheral location from the perspective of the West, the latter’s involvement as a normative and security  power was also limited. The integration in NATO, so enthusiastically started in the 90s, stalled. Officially, the EU merely supported the Minsk process and appointed a special representative in the region. Domestically, however, unresolved conflict was used by the parties to consolidate political control or distract attention from the increasing social problems or governance failure. The absence of the real pressure on either party made the win-lose situation pre-dominant and parties resistant to compromises.

What has changed?

The ineffectiveness of the peace process, absence of pressure on parties to comply with the international law, weak role of the EU and US, exhaustion of the peace tactics, such as economic cooperation incentives, explains  the general unsustainability of peace. The domestic dynamic in Azerbaijan, complicated by “resource curse”  resulted in the strengthening of the autocratic rule, which made a balancing act with Russia easier. Most importantly, the conflicts remained the tool of the Northern neighbor to preserve its influence in all of the Eastern neighborhood.  This role of Russia was not even neutralized by the revolution in Armenia in 2018, as it simply separated political and security fields, retaining role of Russia in the latter.

Expectations from the new democratic leader in Armenia were high in Azerbaijan. It was hoped that, as he did not come from the Karabagh clan, he would choose a less nationalist course in the conflict. However, the opposite happened. Democratically elected charismatic Pashinian faced the necessity to accommodate the nationalist stance of influential and economically powerful institutions – loyal to Russia Karabagh clan and Armenian diaspora in the West. The popular, rather than economic basis of his power, forced him to become increasingly nationalistic, to the level of openly provocative policy.

The change of the military doctrine and weapons from the defensive to offensive, frequent visits to Karabagh, especially to Shusha, previously populated by Azerbaijanis, support for the decision to move there Nagorno-Karabagh “parliament”, a statement that “Karabagh is Armenia”, which made the peace negotiations meaningless – all this contributed to the escalation. No less important issue has been the creation by Armenia of facts on the ground, such as building infrastructure and settling communities on the occupied territories. Moreover, celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Sèvres at the high state level and making it part of the official policy move[1] (which was criticized by the former advisor to Levon Ter-Petrosian – Gerard Libaridian[2]) had created a motivation for Turkey’s closer involvement.

On the other hand, the energy factor which has maintained the “status quo” has been weakening. The oil production decline, after reaching its peak in 2012, was aggravated by the fall of the oil price in 2020, change of energy strategies of the major corporations, their withdrawal from Baku and consequently decrease of the importance of the region and stability there. On the other hand, the energy factors contributing to instability increased. The July 2020 violation of the ceasefire by Armenia  in Tovuz region was perceived as a threat (by Russia) to undermine the safety and security of major energy pipelines passing in the close proximity to the fighting location. Many experts interpreted it as an attempt of Russia to pressure rivals of the Nord Stream project. The more blatant political support of Turkey to Azerbaijan was logical continuation of the growing independence of Erdogan and his policy in the Middle East.

COVID-19 created an additional background and incentive for the instability in two ways. Psychological tension of deprivation of people from ‘live’ communication, reducing this space to electronic only allows for much greater manipulation, utilization of the fake news, insulting expressions and narratives which increase the degree of animosity and tension in the society, making it more receptive to the confrontational rhetoric. For Aliyev, the signal of possible accumulated social dissatisfaction, coupled with the protest against human rights violations, came after the July violation of ceasefire in a form of spontaneous protests that gathered multiple thousands in Baku in support of defense of national borders and the army. The highest number of infected in the region and domestic pressure in Armenia, currency crisis and increase of foreign debt in Turkey, as well as weakening of the Russian ruble and negative growth makes nationalistic sentiments convenient to distract public attention.

Discrimination, discourse and perspective.              

What has not changed, however, is the discourse and perspective on the conflict. In fact, Russia’s domination and control in the area of security has been based on preservation and manipulation of the Soviet legacies in the conflict discourse - premodern narrative of constructed fears, threats, historical points of reference and perspectives on the conflict. Our study showed strong interdependence between more open attitudes to the conflict on one hand and liberal views and more globalized/modernized mindset of respondents on the other. [3] The revolution in Armenia most probably will have limited capacity for consolidation of democratic achievements without liberalization and modernization of society. This needs first of all revision of the old paradigm of security and adjusting it to the contemporary conditions of geopolitics, international relations, globalized and digitalized world, the speedy changing nature of power, and transfer from the perspective of the past to the one of the future.

One of the most obvious consequences of the Soviet discourse is exclusionary thinking and the “win-lose” attitude. In fact, the idea that control might be only direct, material and exclusive is increasingly outdated in the changing world. The belief that the size of the territory is the measure of power or security is in contradiction to the logic of safe and secure environment, as it pushes the state to claim territories of neighbors, thus spoiling relations with them in both short term and long term perspectives. The Karabagh conflict has been frozen for 27 years, with parties involved in imitation rather than real talks on peace. While through effective unification of the Armenia proper with Nagorno-Karabagh its population was developing a quasi state, at least 5 times greater Azerbaijani and Kurdish population of the ethnically cleansed 7 more regions has been displaced, with children growing up in the camps and living by dreams of returning to their homes.

There was a legal basis to fulfill their will. Four UNSC resolutions called for unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops, but they have never been fulfilled. There was no interest in all these years from the EU or any other organization ready to enforce the UNSC resolutions. It was easier to support the OSCE process, where all the problematic issues were contained and frozen. Nor were the perpetrators brought to justice who committed crimes against humanity during the military actions. This is viewed in Azerbaijan as unjust discrimination and selective application of the human rights principles and international law by the Western mediators.

In fact, the absence of serious normative involvement in the conflict left the region at the disposal of Russia, being sometimes referred to as – unlike in the other conflicts – a benevolent actor. The resumption of hostilities showed that the informational campaign portraying Turkey  as a “religious” actor evokes deep civilizational divides in perception and reaction to the conflict. The European countries called for immediate ceasefire and return to the negotiating table without critical assessment of the mediating activities, assurances of serious efforts to pressure for implementation of international resolutions and conventions, and that rights of all victims of the conflict regardless of their ethnic and confessional identity will be addressed and taken into account.

 The coverage of the conflict by media, experts and other institutions showed that there was an enhancement of the pre-modern discourse reflected in the symbolic meaning of the geographic objects, places, landscapes, civilizational identification – by emphasizing the role of mercenaries, painting the confrontation as religious, presenting one-sided information, or even fake news – distracting the attention from the causes of the war. The discourse underlines perspectives directed to the past – making permanent references to the “existential threat” without attempt to de-construct the concept – showing specific policy acts as reasons of the animosity, rather than imagined objectives of the enemy to eliminate the state and the nation. This, however, will require the goodwill and efforts of all parties involved.

 What can be done?

The ongoing war in Karabagh has shown the immediate threats which neglected conflicts may bear for the regional and international peace. The questions “why now?“ and “who violated the ceasefire?” bear less importance than the general question “why war?”

The international community should critically assess the problems of the “status quo”, failure of the negotiations process and undertake urgent measures in the direction of provision of the ceasefire and peace agreement. These measures should address:

 -          Normative deficiency – and should include pressure on each party which violates international law, conventions or agreements concluded since the beginning of the conflict and perpetrates crimes again humanity

-          Application of norms should not be selective but based on the universal and non-discriminative principles, regardless of the ethnic or confessional identity of the party.

If the parties return to the Minsk process

-          The military gains should be delegitimized in the bargaining process – this is needed not only to prevent possible military adventures, but also to reach long lasting peace, which cannot be built under the military pressure.

-          The format of co-chairmen should include non-partisan states in perception of both parties or to be chosen one by each – with participation of a powerful third non-partisan actor.

-          the negotiations of agreement should have a clear ttimetable

In case of bilateral talks

-          All the conditions should be created for the parties to look for the acceptable and mutually beneficial solution with active participation of experts, civil society and other independent institutions.

 

The EU, US and INGOs should realize that support for the status quo means greater entrenchment of Russia in the security field and prevention of changing the discourse of the conflict away from the constructed threats,  and transfer  of the perspective from the past to the future. New discourses should put the conflict in the context of provisional borders, human rights, increasingly digitalized world, non-discrimination in application of international norms and rights, inclusive rather than exclusive solutions. The parties should actively work on de-construction of “threats” in their societies and sending respectful messages to the other party in the conflict,  as well as through confidence building measures and development of vision of the common future.

 

 

[1] The Treaty of Sevres  was signed on 10 August 1920 by Entente and allied states on the one hand and the Ottoman Empire on the other, which has divided the territory of the latter among the other states and included occupied zones  in its territory, but has never been  ratified. According to this treaty, Armenia would get lands granting her access to the Black Sea.

[2]  Gerard Libaridian in his article “ A step, this time a big step back” called the statements of Armenia’s president and prime minister as equal to the declaration of the at least a diplomatic war ( aravot. Ru 1 September 2020 https://www.aravot-ru.am/2020/09/02/335325/

[3] Leila Alieva, Bakhtiyar Aslanov (2018) How Autocracy Impedes De-Securitization: Case Study of Nagorno-Karabagh” Caucasus Survey, April.

Leila Alieva.jpg

Dr. Leila Alieva is an affiliate of Russian and East European Studies, Oxford University School for Global and Area Studies, and a part-time tutor at the Oxford Department for Continued Education, previously Senior Common Room member of St. Antony’s College,  Oxford University  and an academic visitor. She was founder and a president of two “think-tanks” in Azerbaijan. In 2018 she was a research fellow at the Institute Fur Kulturwissenschaften (IFK) in Vienna, Austria. Her research is in the EU and the area studies – ENP, EaP and Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Former Soviet Union; along with Russia, energy security,  democratization and civil society in the oil rich states.