By Joy Hellers
In light of the Belarusian president Lukashenko´s visit to Vienna on November, 11-12, the IIP held a public talk with Artyom Shraibman (Sense Analytics, Minsk) on November 4th. The discussion with the expert covered Belaru’ domestic politics, relationship between Belarus and the West, especially with the EU, and relations with Russia.
Belarus is an authoritarian regime, where civil rights aren´t fully guaranteed and a real opposition is absent. Even though Belarus is known in the West especially because of the repression of media freedom and human rights, the authorities have put some informal limits on the scale of repression. Although not much has structurally changed in the country, Belarus seems to care increasingly about its image among the Western neighbors. The central government pays more attention to local social protests. For example, due to a hunger strike carried out by the ,,Mothers 328”, who campaigned for liberalization of drug policies, a government meeting was held in order to discuss ways to fight against drug consumption and distribution. Another issue that was discussed is the likely transition of power. It was underlined that President Lukashenka will probably retain some control mechanisms after this power transition. He has already announced that he is seeking to conduct a constitutional reform (most likely between 2020 and 2024) in the near future in order to prepare the country and the political system for a ‘successor’ (the anticipated reform is expected to decrease presidential competencies). Nevertheless, even though an update on the current constitution is going to happen, no radical reforms should be expected.
In terms of Belarus’ relations with the Western neighbors, they have been intensifying in the recent years. Belarus started playing different and new roles in the region due to the conflict in Ukraine. Thus, Minsk became an important platform for dialogue between various actors, especially between Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. Hence, a new image of the country as a peacekeeping mediator emerged. Moreover, the visa facilitation agreement with the EU will be signed. As the relationship between Belarus and the EU normalized, Lukashenka´s visit to Vienna appears as a logical consequence of the rapprochement between the West and Belarus. Nevertheless, many issues remain unresolved. The EU has not ratified the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement completed in 1995 due to the lack of democracy and political and civil rights in Belarus. If the EU does not recognize improvements concerning the democratic and the civic situation in Belarus, a full economic and social cooperation will remain complicated. Concerning the relationship with the US, several high-level visits between Minsk and Washington took place. In 2020 both countries will exchange ambassadors.
While Belarus is intensifying its relations with the EU and the West in general, Russia is moving in the opposite direction. Russia is fortifying its visa regimes and Belarus has introduced visa-free travel. Further discussions occurred between the neighboring countries due to Russia´s latest oil tax reform. With this reform, Belarus must buy oil from Russia at the world market terms, which would be a crucial hit to Belarusian economy. While Belarus is demanding some sort of compensation, Russia insists on deeper integration. This integration consists of some domestic legal reforms and a legal harmonization between the two countries. The main problem, about how two countries of such unequal power and unbalanced size, can create an equal and fair union, persists.
During a Question & Answer session the relationship between Belarus and China was underlined. China can help Belarus in diversifying foreign trade and foreign military policies. In cooperation with China, Belarus installed a multiple launch rocket system, namely Polonez. Even though China gives room to different maneuvers, only 5% of Belarusian trade is with China, while around 50% represent trade with Russia. Furthermore, Belarus lives in the informational space of Moscow and therefore some sort of integration with China seems unlikely.
Another question addressed the dependency of the Belarusian currency on the Russian ruble. As the currency of all other countries, the Belarusian ruble depends on the currency of its key partners. As Russia is the key partner of Belarus, there is a strong correlation between both currencies. They usually follow the same trends.
Belarus is often considered as one of the in-between states and seems therefore fit for neutrality. Even though Belarus will probably remain in the Russian integration bloc, an entry in the neutrality camp would open new ways of dialogue and maneuver for Belarus. Especially the role of Minsk in the Ukraine crisis, showed Belarus´ universalism. As Belarus is the most integrated Russian neighbor, the process of becoming a neutral state would be very long and slow.
Furthermore, the possible influence of the elections in Russia in 2024 on elections in Belarus was raised. Even though elections are always a question of speculations, they are often affected by the elections in neighboring countries. Belarus, and particularly Lukashenka, will observe the elections in Russia, but especially the elections in Kazakhstan will be followed closely. Although the three countries have three different political systems, the Kazakh system and particularly the role of the president are more similar to Belarus than Russia. A transition of power in Russia could not be implemented likewise in Belarus and therefore especially Kazakhstan moves in the perspective of Belarus.
Stanislav Zas, the current State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus, will become the next head of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Lukashenko will be Chairman to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2020. Belarus will therefore hold Chairmanship of the two most important post-soviet integration blocs. Nevertheless, how much formal power do these positions provide to influence Russia´s power? Even though Russia is the most powerful nation of the participant states, Belarus can in this manner point out Belarusian interests.
In relation to a question concerning interesting dynamics in the opposition, it was highlighted that a victory of a party considered as being part of the opposition, is far from the horizon. As the opposition has been chronologically disintegrated, a lack of motivation to become part of this opposition has been observed. Belarus is therefore suffering from two important drains. Firstly, the brain drain leads to the emigration of talented and motivated people. As the opposition appears as a constant ‘looser force’ in Belarusian politics, many young and dedicated people don´t see a point in trying to gain a position in politics. Hence, many favor a career in business and journalism, or they prefer to emigrate. Secondly, the money drain leads to a lack in funding and sponsoring for the opposition, which hinders a proper integration in the political process.
In a concluding statement, it was highlighted that Belarus can act as a bridge between the East and the West. The main problem hereby remains the lack of implementations concerning transparency, corruption, rule of law, LGBTQ rights, etc. in Belarus. Belarus doesn´t fulfill the required conditions to become a full trading and investment partner of the European Union. However, progress can be made on energy or infrastructure projects. This progress all depends on funding, and right now Belarus is not the top investment project of the EU.